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ABSTRACT 
This study tracks changing conceptions of the Crusades among Arab authors, 
from medieval through modern sources, examining how current emotionally charged 
interpretations of the Crusades came into the literature and how they came to resonate.  
This study shows that in medieval Arabic sources, the campaigns and settlement of the 
Christian Franks is not seen as a discrete event, and despite modern interpretations of a 
two-hundred year struggle between two sides, that the Franks are seen as just one more 
facet in the political scene of the era, often of less concern than “internal” enemies.  The 
study then tracks the introduction of the concept of the Crusades as a discrete event into 
Arab historical writing in the mid-nineteenth century via Christian Arabs working from 
Western sources and its gradual inclusion in Muslim Arab historical thought.  Finally, 
this study examines modern Arabic interpretations of the Crusades, colored by current 
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PURPOSE    
One of the most common rhetorical strategies used by Islamic extremists to attack 
the West is to rally the “Arab street” against “the Crusaders.”  Today’s Arab Muslims are 
still (or newly?) bitter about the Crusades, the reference to which makes them “relive the 
barbaric encounters of those times.”1  In just one recent example of extremist use of this 
rhetoric, the Zarqawi network’s statement on their 09 November 2005 attacks on 
Jordanian hotels announced their action as attacking “a back yard for the enemies of 
Islam, such as the Jews and Crusaders.“2    
The objective of this thesis is to find out why bitterness about the Crusades is a 
common theme among Arab Muslims today, whereas the primary sources from the time 
of the Crusades seem to show little evidence of this.  Research shows that the 
identification of the European Christian warriors seeking to reclaim the Holy Land as 
“Crusaders” (salībiyyūn) does not appear in the primary literature of the time, which 
refers to the Western invaders consistently as “Franks” (faranj) and only obliquely 
references any religious motivation to their appearance in the Levant.  Similarly, the well 
known feeling of “resentment over defeat” does not appear in the primary literature.  This 
study traces how and when this cultural resentment came to be, and how it is articulated 
and transmitted. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
It is clear that the Crusades are an extremely emotional issue among Muslims 
today.  Bitterness about the Crusades shows up in some very anti-Western, and 
sometimes very violent, contexts.  Libyan propaganda in the early 1980s attempted to 
mobilize its population against America, which was presented as having launched “the 
offensive of the Cross against Islam.”3 Mehmet Ali Agha, before his attempted 
assassination of the Pope in 1981, wrote in a letter, “I have decided to kill John Paul II, 
                                                 
1 Abbas Kadhim, statement at lecture attended by author, Monterey, CA, 10 November 2005. 
2 Jonathan Finer and Craig Whitlock, Washington Post, 11 November 2005, A21.  
3 Carole Hillenbrand, Crusades then and Now, 2000, www.caabu.org, accessed 23 October, 2005. 
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the supreme commander of the Crusades.”4  The most famous of these uses of anti-
Crusader rhetoric is Usama Bin-Laden’s fatwa of 1998, in which he called for the killing 
of Americans, military and civilian.  It was entitled “Text of World Islamic Front’s 
Statement Urging Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.”5 
This research seeks to explain the production, transmission, and function of myths 
of defeat. The Arab myth of seminal defeat in the Crusades is a particularly interesting 
case, as most other “national tragedy” frames, such as France‘s loss of Alsace-Lorraine, 
or Germany’s defeat in World War One, are heavily examined by, and motivational for, 
the society only within the historical context of the “fruits of defeat,” i.e., the period 
during which the direct results (loss of territory, reparations payments, etc.) are ongoing.   
Others, such as the mythic Serbian defeat at Kosovo in 1389, and, this thesis argues, that 
of the Arab experience in the Crusades are re-introduced and re-interpreted well after 
their original context, when society is “similarly threatened,” whether the threat is in fact 
at all similar, or even real.   This study will help policy makers understand the roots and 
use of a resentment that gives extremists the ability to manipulate lay Arab Muslims with 
anti-Crusader rhetoric.  This, in turn, will help determine ways to take account of the 
effects of this rhetoric. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sources seeking to explain modern Arab bitterness about the Crusades show a 
striking unity of thought, seeing its roots directly in the primary records of the 
circumstances of the Crusades.  Direct examination of primary sources, however, seems 
to disaggregate modern conceptions from those of the era.   An examination of literature 
on what Eric Hobsbawm has called the “invention of tradition” gives a theoretical basis 
for explaining this disconnect. 
1. The “Happy Equilibrium” 
This is not a field with a wide body of secondary literature, but a few 
comprehensive treatments do exist.  Most notably Amin Malouf6 and Carole Hillenbrand7 
                                                 
4 Carole Hillenbrand, Crusades then and Now. 
5  Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin-Laden's Fatwa.” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 21, no. 4 (1998): 321-330. 
6  Amin Malouf, Crusades through Arab Eyes (New York: Schocken, 1984). 
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look specifically at the Muslim viewpoint of the Crusades.  Additionally, the subject is 
treated in biographical sources, most notably biographies of Saladin,8 9 and in various 
scholarly journal articles.10  Broadly, these sources can be divided into two groups, those 
that simply report a consolidated account of the Crusades based on the medieval Muslim 
sources and those that attempt interpretation.  Malouf and Hillenbrand typify these two 
approaches.  Malouf makes his goal clear in his forward when he states, “the basic idea of 
this book is simple: to tell the story of the Crusades as they were seen, lived, and 
recorded on ‘the other side’ –in other words, in the Arab camp.”11  Hillenbrand, on the 
other hand, is devoted to “evoking the detailed responses of the Muslims to the Crusader 
presence.” 12  The interpretive works are mostly interested in showing the cultural 
superiority of Arabs at the time, especially in their own eyes, and in “evoking” (rather 
than explaining) the sense of victimhood that modern Arabs feel about the Crusades.  
There are no debating camps here.  Authors who have discussed modern Arab responses 
to the Crusades present them similarly, as a natural reaction to the unwarranted and 
barbarous attack of the Crusaders.  The singular exception to this approach is the work of 
Sivan13  who approaches Arab historiography of the Crusades in the period between 
World War II and 1973 as Arab Nationalist re-interpretation.   
2. Upsetting the Apple Cart 
Sivan‘s iconoclasm is worthy of further examination.  A review of the pertinent 
primary medieval Arab histories does not reveal the outrage expressed by modern sources 
at the time of the invasion itself, or for much of the time of the Western Christian 
“Crusader States” in the Levant.  Instead, the invaders were seen as just one more in a 
                                                 
7  Carole Hilllenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
8 for example,  P.H. Newby, Saladin in his time (London: Phoenix Press, 1983). 
9 Note: Arabic names are transliterated phonetically into Latin characters throughout, with the 
exception of those, like Saladin, who have a common 'westernization” in use in English writings, in which 
case this common name is retained. 
10 Examples include Joseph Drory, “Early Muslim Reflections on the Crusaders.” Jerusalem Studies 
in Arabic and Islam no. 25 (2001): 92-101. and Matti Moosa, “The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, with 
Emphasis on Syriac Sources.” Muslim World: A Journal Devoted to the Study of Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations 93, no. 2 (2003): 249-289.  For further examples, see bibliography. 
11  Malouf, Crusades through Arab Eyes, ix. 
12 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 1. 
13 Emmanuel Sivan, A Modern Arab Historiography of the Crusades (Kfar Chabad: Tel-Aviv 
University, 1973). 
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series of actors in the region. The presumptive ideological motives that give “the 
Crusades” their historical unity is the West was not apparent to the other side.  Muslim 
chroniclers of the time were unconcerned with this Western concept and simply saw what 
we think of as “the Crusades” as more in a series of conflicts involving various enemies.  
They are certainly chronicled, not as a distinct event, but as occurrences within a 
chronological framework.   
The majority of the primary sources agree that the initial reaction to the Frankish 
presence was one of limited interest.  Religious and cultural outrage was very hard to 
find, even among those city-states with new Frankish neighbors.  Only the dispossessed 
attempted to urge a general jihad, and these attempts fell mostly on deaf ears, especially 
in far off Baghdad.  This was seen initially as simply a provincial Syrian problem.  This 
is particularly surprising as the first wave of the Crusades included the most egregious 
atrocities14 and the loss of the holy places of Jerusalem. 
These sources also agree that a swelling of anti-Frankish jihad rhetoric and 
feeling began in earnest after a decade of Frankish occupation, but that the feeling never 
fully took priority over local rivalries and other political considerations.  Even at its 
height, during Saladin’s control over Egypt and Syria, as much or more military effort 
was spent on fellow Muslims as upon Crusader armies and holdings.   
While the literature attempting to evoke Arab bitterness over this era points to 
many sources of ill-will based on Frankish action, it does not successfully explain the 
“second priority status” of anti-Frankish jihad, nor the many examples of Frankish 
cooperation with various Muslim factions throughout the era.   
How, then, did we get from the general Muslim apathy of the First Crusade to the 
Muslim victory of 1291 and then to the bitterness and “lasting psychological scars”15 of 
today?  It is clear that this historical viewpoint is invented, or at least, re-interpreted, 
rather than organic.  An examination of the process of historical re-working offers 
valuable insight. 
 
                                                 
14 for example: the reported anthropophagi in Ma’arra, and the slaughter of the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem.  
15 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 614. 
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3. Invented History: A Theoretical Framework for Changing 
Perspectives 
A robust literature exists on the re-interpretation, or “invention” of history among 
identity groups.  Most of this discussion takes place within the debate on nationalism16, 
though it is also treated in works on ethnicity17 and post-colonial identity.18  The essence 
of the argument within this literature is that identity groups interpret and invent history, 
both intentionally and subconsciously, to strengthen their identity bonds and to make 
sense of their status at a given historical moment.  That which makes sense in the power 
relations of the moment, and/or the goals of the identity group for the future, is enshrined 
with the legitimacy of history.  While this phenomenon is most often noted in the 
glorification of an imagined (even if based on factual history) “Golden Age” or the semi-
deification of a “national hero,” myths of epic defeat are sometimes imagined as an 
explanation of why such a proud and strong identity group should find itself in a 
subordinate position.  As Sollors puts it, “it is always the specificity of power relations at 
a given historical moment and in a particular place that triggers off a strategy of pseudo-
historical explanations that camouflage the inventive act itself.”19  
A well-known example of the myth of epic defeat is the Serbian interpretation of 
the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.  While it is famous as a crushing defeat brought on by 
treachery that led the Serbs into centuries of Turkish subjugation, sources at the time of 
the battle saw it as a strategic draw.  Constructed history has made of it a cultural 
touchstone, however, that nationalist leaders have disingenuously used to inflame Serb 
passions and strengthen Serb identity at the cost of generating significant “out-group” 
hatred and discrimination.  Arab Nationalist interpretations of the Crusades show a 
mixture of the “Golden Age” and/or “Saladin as national hero” interpretations with those 
of a crippling epic struggle that explain current power relations.  Islamic fundamentalist 
interpretations, however, tell a more straight forward story of unprovoked attack and 
                                                 
16 The best known examples include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism ( New York: Verso, 1991). and E.J. Hobsawm and Terence Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1992).  For further examples see bibliography.  
17 most notably, Werner Sollors, The Invention of Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991). 
18 for example: David Gordon, Self-Determination and History in the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971). 
19 Sollors, The Invention of Ethnicity, xvi. 
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catastrophic defeat, with similar mixed purposes of strengthening identity bonds by 
showing threat to the group and of explaining dolorous historic circumstances.  
D. SOME QUESTIONS OF TERMINOLOGY 
When examining the Crusades, there are three important terms to consider:  
“Franks,” “jihad,” and “Crusade,”  The first two of these are rather straight forward, 
while “Crusade” requires some examination.  “Franks” is a generic term used in all 
medieval Arabic sources to refer to Western Europeans.  The term “Franks” is 
differentiated from “Armin” (Armenians) and Rum (Byzantines), but does not specify 
people of French origin.  As French was the lingua franca (literally) of the Western 
Europeans who came to the Middle East, the term refers to all Western Europeans.  
“Jihad” is an Arabic word meaning “an effort, or struggle.” In a religious context, it has 
two meanings.  According to Islamic tradition, Muslims have a responsibility to 
undertake both the “Greater Jihad” of internal spiritual struggle against one‘s base nature, 
and the “Lesser Jihad” of armed struggle on the behalf of Islam.  While the first is 
considered by scholars to be of much greater importance, it is not highly relevant to the 
military campaigns under consideration in this study.  For the purposes of this thesis then, 
jihad will be used only in the context of armed religious struggle. 
It is not surprising that early Arab sources refer to the coming of the Franks, 
rather than the “Crusaders,” for that term was not current among the European 
participants at the time of the (as it is now called) First Crusade, either.  They spoke 
instead of an “armed pilgrimage,” a term also not found in Arabic sources, whose 
conception of the religious nature of the coming of the Franks was, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, quite tenuous.  The English word “Crusade” comes from the Old French 
“croiserie,” meaning “to mark with a cross,” or “to take the cross.”  Its first recorded use 
in English in the now common context of “religiously inspired war in the holy land” 
dates to 1290, the year before the last “Crusader state” fell.20   The phrase “to take the 
cross” was commonly used during the period of the Crusades to mean, “to take a vow to 
                                                 
20 Oxford English Dictionary, online edition at 
http://dictionary.oed.com.libproxy.nps.edu:8080/cgi/entry/50054311?query_type=word&queryword=crusa
de, accessed 27 Jan 2007. 
7 
go fight in the holy land, and to mark one‘s clothing with a cross in sign of that,”21 and 
thus the verb form, if not the noun, is period to the era, if not the dominant term it has 
since become.  By the end of the Middle Ages, the noun and its current meaning were in 
common use.  As it is the word “Crusade” that has accumulated so many varying 
connotations, both in European languages and in Arabic, this paper will make use of it 
throughout, even for early eras in which it may be anachronistic.   The Arabic term “al-
hurub as-selibiya” is a translation of the French “Croisade,” and means literally “cross 




                                                 
21 for example, the tale of the dying “Young King” Henry in 1183, who had taken such a vow and 
never fulfilled it.  After receiving extreme unction, he gave his cloak with a red cross sewn onto the 
shoulder and, according to Painter's translation of the Historie de Guillaume le Marechal, said, “Marshal, 
you have always been loyal and faithful.  I leave you my cross and pray for me my vow to carry it to the 
Holy Sepulchre.  You will acquit for me my vow to God.”  Sydney Painter, William Marshal: Knight-
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II. MUSLIM RESPONSES TO THE CRUSADES AS 
CHRONICLED BY MEDIEVAL ARAB SOURCES 
This chapter examines Muslim perspectives on the Crusades during the Crusading 
era.  Review of primary sources shows that Muslim reaction was remarkably 
unconcerned over the advent of the First Crusade and the formation of the Crusader 
States.  Response built up over time, however, though anti-Frankish rhetoric was rarely 
reflected in significant high-profile military action as pictured in modern perceptions of 
the “Counter-Crusade.”  The main changes to Islamic thought were attitudes about the 
institution of jihad and the city of Jerusalem in response to rhetoric intended to reverse 
the initial unconcern. Although anti-Frankish invective can be found within the period 
literature, it is less fervid than that aimed at “internal” enemies, such as the Assassins, 
and seems rarely to have led to direct action.  These reactions are certainly insufficient to 
explain modern bitterness in the Islamic world over the Crusades. 
A. MEDIEVAL ARABIC SOURCES 
There are many primary sources written in Arabic by Islamic chroniclers that 
cover the era of the Crusades.  Many important primary sources are not available in 
English translation, of which the best known is Ibn al-Athir‘s Universal History.22  This is 
a major barrier to accessibility to many Western Islamic scholars who do not read Arabic.  
Others, such as Damascene chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi23 are available both in the original 
Arabic and in translation. Primary sources in the original language are, of course, the 
most authoritative, but they do have difficulties aside from the language barrier itself.  As 
mentioned above, the Crusades as a distinct event are not found in period Arab sources.  
The student is forced to search for snippets of Muslim response within universal or local 
histories, biographies, and the like.  While these snippets are extremely valuable, they can 
be difficult to find and to interpret. 
A major difficulty in interpreting these works is the authors’ tendency toward 
ideological demonizing of any enemy, be they Franks, “heretical” Muslims (for example, 
                                                 
22 'Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (Beirut: Dar Sadr, 1966). 
23 Abu Ya'la Hamzah ibn Asad Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhayl tarikh Dimishq (Beirut: Mutb'aa al-Aaba' al-
Yaswa'aiin, 1908). 
10 
Seljuk Sunni referring to Fatamid Shia), or even an enemy city-state of the same sect.  
War against all of these enemies is couched as jihad,24 and the side the chronicler 
represents is “the Muslims” in almost all contexts.  The only major difference is that the 
Franks never become “the Muslims” in a later context when they were on the same side 
as the chronicler’s faction.  This makes for difficulty in separating the “propaganda of the 
moment” from possible deep-seated Muslim hostility and true desire to expel the invader. 
B. WHY THE FRANKS CAME 
The arrival of the Franks in the Holy Land was not seen as a momentous event by 
Muslim chroniclers of the era, and certainly not as the opening round in an epic religious 
struggle.  As discussed earlier, the concept of a “Crusade,” as such, was not yet current 
even among the participants, and even the notion of an armed pilgrimage, dedicated to 
“liberating” Christian holy places, so current among the Frankish forces themselves, is 
not reflected by the Arab chronicles.  Many of the chroniclers, such as Ibn al-Jawzi and 
Ibn al-Qalanisi, spend no time on Frankish motivations whatsoever, simply noting their 
presence by means of what cities they besieged.  Ibn al-Athir gives the most reflection on 
the matter and offers the explanation closest to Christian zeal for the holy land.  Even he, 
however, offers it as one alternative explanation, and, if true, the result not of papal 
exhortation, but of political maneuvering on the part of Roger of Sicily.   His conjecture 
is worth quoting in full. 
In the year 490[H.], they [the Franks] attacked Syria. The reason for that is 
that their King, Barduil,25 who was a relative of Roger the Frank, who 
ruled Sicily, gathered a great host of Franks and sent word to Roger 
saying, ‘I have assembled a great host, and now I am on my way to you, 
where I will depart for Africa26 and conquer it and become your neighbor.’   
 Roger gathered his companions and consulted them about this.  
They said, ‘By the truth of the gospel, this will be a fine thing both for 
them and for us, as the country will become a Christian land.’  Then Roger 
raised his leg and let loose a mighty fart and said, ‘that is of more use than 
your speech!’  And why is that? He said, ‘If this host comes to me I will 
incur many expenses and [have to provide] ships to carry them to Africa 
and forces from my military, as well. If they conquer the country, it will                                                  
24 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 10. 
25 Unknown reference.  Barduil is a common “transliteration” of Baldwin, but no King Baldwin was 
reigning at that time. 
26 In this context, Africa likely refers to the coast opposite Sicily, i.e., the area now known as 
Tunisia. 
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be theirs, but they will need provisioning from Sicily.  This would cut into 
the money I receive from the annual harvest.  If they fail, they will return 
to my country, and I would suffer discredit on their behalf.  Further, 
Tamim27 will say that I have betrayed him and violated my pledge, and 
communication and travel between us will be disrupted.  The country of 
Africa remains for us.  When we find the strength, we will take it.’ 
 He summoned his messenger and said to him: ‘If you are resolved 
to fight28 the Muslims, it would be better to conquer Jerusalem. By 
removing it from their hands, the honor would be yours.  As for Africa, 
there are treaties and trust between myself and its people.’  So the Franks 
made ready and descended upon Syria. 
 Another story is that that Alawite rulers of Egypt were afraid when 
they saw the power and capability of the Seljuk empire and its occupation 
of Syria as far as Gaza.  No country remained between them and Egypt to 
resist them, and Aqsees29 entered Egypt and besieged it.  They therefore 
sent word to the Franks and invited them to invade Syria and rule it and be 
between them and the Muslims.  But God alone knows.30 
 
C. INITIAL MUSLIM RESPONSES 
The initial Muslim reaction to the Frankish presence was one of limited interest.  
Evidence of widespread religious and cultural outrage is very hard to find.  As noted 
above, only the dispossessed attempted to urge a general jihad, a call which evoked little 
response in Baghdad, which saw this as simply a Syrian provincial problem.  For all that 
this first wave of the Crusades included the most egregious atrocities and the loss of the 
holy places of Jerusalem, it did not evoke extensive passion, or even comment.  
Jerusalem fell to the Franks on the 15th of July, 1099.  By August, the qadi Abu 
Sa’ad al-Harawi had traveled from Damascus to Baghdad with a number of Jerusalem 
refugees.  There he pled with the caliph directly for aid.  The caliph responded by 
appointing a panel of dignitaries to investigate the “troublesome events.”  No report of 
the results of this investigation was recorded.31  Why were the losses of much of the 
Syrian coast, the important city of Antioch, and the third holiest city in Islam treated so 
cavalierly?  Much of the answer lies in politics within the Dar al-Islam.   
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The major polities at the time were the Sunni Abbasid caliphate, under Seljuk 
control in Baghdad, and the rival Shia (Ismaili) Fatimid caliphate in Cairo.  This, in itself, 
was a major factor, as much of the areas that fell to the Franks were in between, and often 
contested by, the two power centers.  In fact, Jerusalem had passed from Abbasid to 
Fatamid control just one year before it fell to the Franks.  Feelings between the two 
groups of Muslims ran high.  Many scholars believe that the Franks’ presence was 
accepted as a buffer between the two or, at least, as a less important threat.  The Sunni 
majority saw Ismaili Shiism, and especially the Assassin sect, as a greater enemy.  Drory 
typifies this view when he writes, “The Frankish menace continued to be perceived as 
confined to the battlefield, and even there it was regarded as ephemeral.  The orthodox 
adherents of Islam continued to be more troubled by ideological threats from within.”32 
While this view has some legitimacy, a greater problem seems to lie in the 
fragmented and fractious politics within the Seljuk-dominated Abbasid caliphate.  While 
the Fatamid and Abbasid caliphates look on a map like two great powers, there was little 
unity within either, especially the Abbasid.  After the death of Malik Shah in 1092, the 
Seljuk domination fragmented.  All of the major cities of the Abbasid caliphate were 
dominated by various Seljuk kings and princes.  Very few of these leaders controlled 
more than one major city, and they all fought with each other for control of dependent 
towns and farmlands and, sometimes, even for the rival city itself.  Thus, what looks like 
a great Abbasid empire was in reality a swirling mass of warring city-states.  Rarely did 
these leaders band together to fight the Franks, nor had they often banded together 
against the Fatamids. 
Clearly power politics among the Seljuks took priority over jihad against the 
Franks.  Two examples of the intervention of Mosul governors, that of Karbuqa in 1097 
and that of Mawdud in 1111, will illustrate this issue.   
In 1097, when the Franks were attacking northern Syria, they benefited from an 
ongoing state of war between the kings of Damascus and Aleppo.  The governor of  
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Antioch, through careful diplomacy, got the two kings (who, incidentally, were brothers) 
to band together with him against the Franks.  They proved unable to lift the siege of 
Antioch unassisted, however. 
Karbuqa, the atabeg of Mosul, was convinced to send a force into Syria, but it 
dissolved in the face of conflict among the various commanders. As Ibn-Athir relayed, 
“the atabeg so annoyed the Muslims that they decided to betray him at the battle’s most 
decisive moment.”33  Karbuqa returned to Mosul without having engaged the Franks.  
The Franks took Antioch, and the kings of Aleppo and Damascus retreated to their cities 
to defend them.   
A similar fractious attempt at intervention came in 1111.  Citizens of Aleppo 
(without the support of Ridwan, king of Aleppo) made pleas for help in Baghdad and 
responded violently when they were ignored.  They destroyed minabeer (pulpits) in 
protest and disrupted Friday sermons until the Seljuk Sultan, Muhammad, agreed to 
mount an expedition.34  The expedition did march to Syria under the leadership of 
Mawdud, emir of Mosul.  It fell apart rapidly, however, as many Syrian emirs didn’t 
support it, and the king of Aleppo barred the gates to his “allies.”  The Mosul forces went 
home without fighting a battle. When the sultan sent the force back in 1113, this time 
going to Damascus, Mawdud was murdered, most believed under the orders of the atabeg 
of Damascus. 
Sultan Muhammad raised a truly wide-based force in response and invaded Syria 
in 1115.  When he arrived, he was met by a Frankish-Syrian coalition including the King 
of Jerusalem and the Seljuk leaders of Damascus and Aleppo.  Clearly, Syrian Emirs saw 
the “foreign” co-religionist who was their theoretical superior as a much greater threat 
than the unbeliever Franks.   
The primacy of power politics over religious zeal was to be seen time and time 
again throughout the era.  Although attempts to unify the Muslims in jihad against the 
Franks began very early, they had mixed results throughout the Crusading era.  Even at 
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the apogee of Islamic unity, Muslim rulers were still known to make treaties with the 
Franks while they dealt with fractious fellow Muslims. 
D. THE GROWTH OF JIHAD RHETORIC 
In the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, jihad as a unified struggle to expand the Dar al-
Islam had largely died out.  Jihad preaching continued, but the context had changed 
considerably with the stabilization of most borders.  Most anti-Christian and anti-pagan 
jihad had become a case of raid and counter-raid along relatively set borders.  Diluting 
jihad further was the use of the term against fellow Muslims, as mentioned earlier. 
By 985, al-Muqaddasi said of Syria. “The inhabitants have no zeal for holy war 
and no vehemence in the fight against the enemy.”35  Hillenbrand summarizes the state of 
jihad with her statement, “When the Crusaders approached the Holy Land in 1099 the 
disunited and strife-ridden Muslim world had, it seems, buried the idea of jihad deep into 
the recesses of its mind.”36  One would think that the disastrous defeats and the clear 
religious divide would spark an immediate return of the jihad ideal, but, as seen above, 
this was not the case. 
The dominant expression of Muslim opinion of the Franks both prior to and 
following the fall of Jerusalem was centered not on their religion, but on their personal 
habits. According to these views “The Franks did not follow civilized pursuits.  They 
were filthy in their personal habits, lacking in sexual morality and proper marital 
jealousy, but courageous and redoubtable in war.”37  While barbaric, they were martially 
respected, and even useful.   They were not seen as a natural religious enemy who must 
be forced from the Muslim lands at all costs. 
The first to seriously challenge this view was the Damascus legist as-Sulami, who 
wrote “The Book of Jihad” (Kitab al-Jihad) in 1105.  As-Sulami’s work was widely 
ignored in his own generation, but set the groundwork for the revival of jihad ideology 
that began the 1140s.  As-Sulami envisioned a three step process of jihad.  He 
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emphasized the need for a spiritual revival among the Muslims as a first step, urging  
them to undertake the greater jihad.  His next step called for the unification of the 
Muslims of Syria, Egypt and the Jazira.  Finally, the unified Muslim forces would expel 
the Franks. 
E. THE “COUNTER CRUSADE:” RHETORIC BEGINS TO PRODUCE 
ACTION 
It was as-Sulami’s second step, unification, that seemed particularly to appeal to 
Seljuk rulers.  After as-Sulami, jihad was rarely invoked until late in the reign of Zengi 
(1126-1146).  Some historians (modern and medieval-Muslim alike) consider Zengi a 
reviver of jihad, while others see him as interested only in extending his power at the 
expense of the Franks and/or of other Muslims.  He did use some jihad rhetoric and 
claims, but was not truly thought of as a mujahid until 1144, when he conquered the 
County of Edessa.  While the next conquest he set his sights on was Muslim Damascus, 
many contemporaries took his conquest of a Frankish state as a preliminary to a 
reconquest of Jerusalem and the sahil.  Instead, he was killed in 1146, and his territories 
fractured once again. 
The conquest of Edessa gave great impetuous to previously sporadic calls for 
jihad.  The Second Crusade (strangely aimed at Damascus, rather than the recapture of 
Edessa) truly built jihad momentum.  For the first time, jihad sentiment and a major 
Frankish invasion coincided.  The stage was set for Nur ad-Din (1146-1174) to take up 
the mantle of the leader of the mujahidin.  While the vast majority of Nur ad-Din’s 
military career after the Second Crusade was spent fighting other Muslims, he 
consistently used jihad and the need for Muslim unity as the justification of his 
conquests.  While besieging Damascus in 1151, he sent a message seeking capitulation 
which said, “I seek nothing but the good of the Muslims and jihad against the associators 
(mushrikeen, i.e., the Franks) and the release of the prisoners in their hands.  If the army 
of Damascus appears with us and aids us in the jihad, and matters go agreeably and 
appropriately, that is the extent of my wish and desire.”38  
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Well known as a pious ruler and defender of Sunni orthodoxy, Nur ad-Din 
endowed many religious monuments and buildings, all of which bore inscriptions 
praising him as a leader of jihad.  A skilled mobilizer of ideological motivations, “Nur 
ad-Din had numerous ‘agents,’ either paid or voluntary, at his disposal, and employed a 
great variety of methods for spreading his ideology throughout the entire social 
structure.”39  It was during his reign that the recapture of Jerusalem became the 
centerpiece of the “Counter-Crusade.”  Nonetheless, Nur ad-Din never directly threatened 
Jerusalem.  His greatest accomplishment was the conquest of Egypt and the dissolution of 
the Ismaili Fatamid Caliphate.  When he died, his realm went through the traditional 
fragmentation. 
It was Saladin, Nur ad-Din’s erstwhile lieutenant in Egypt, who was to take up his 
mantle and realize the goal of Jerusalem.  First, though, he spent a decade fighting fellow 
Muslims and made truces with the Franks as he attempted to consolidate his power.  An 
astute student of Nur ad-Din, he never failed to couch his conquests in jihadi terms and 
mobilized significant jihad “propaganda.”  Even more than his predecessor, Saladin 
aimed his jihad aspirations and rhetoric at Jerusalem.  During his reign, the “Merits of 
Jerusalem” (Fada’il al-Quds) writings reached their peak, and, for the first time, included 
writers from outside Palestine, such as Baghdad’s Ibn al-Jawzi.   
Prior to 1150, the position of Jerusalem was ambivalent among Muslims.  On the 
one hand, it contains significant religious importance, especially al-Aqsa mosque.  On the 
other hand, prior to the First Crusade, Hanbali scholars had already marginalized its 
position as a holy place due to its being “tainted by the influence of Judaeo-Christian 
traditions and innovations.”40  During Nur ad-Din and Saladin’s reigns, Jerusalem, all but 
ignored from 1099-1150, became an object of deep longing.  “Merits of Jerusalem” 
books became common and were frequently read aloud to evoke the sanctity of Jerusalem 
and the importance of its recapture. In 1187, Saladin realized his goal.  By now, even 
Hanbalis were convinced, and Hanbali legist Ibn Qudama joined Saladin on his triumphal 
entry into Jerusalem on 2 October, 1187. 
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F. POST JERUSALEM: RETURN TO AN EBB AND FLOW OF HOSTILITY  
Following the conquest of Jerusalem, Saladin’s forces took every Frankish city 
and stronghold except Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch.  Jihad enthusiasm was difficult to 
sustain for these last few outposts.  Blunting the Third Crusade took up the remainder of 
Saladin’s energy for jihad.  Upon his death, his region once again fragmented into 
various Ayyubid statelets, and, as had been seen so often before, many of them made 
treaties, and even alliances, with the Franks.  The wave of jihad zeal among the rulers 
had spent itself on Jerusalem.  By 1229, the Ayyubid Sultan al-Kamil went so far into 
pragmatism as to cede Jerusalem to Frederick II for ten years in exchange for military aid 
against his relatives.  A similar ceding occurred in 1243 after the previous agreement 
expired. 
In contrast, the continuous preaching of jihad and the importance of Jerusalem 
still had the power to motivate the average Syrian Muslim.  In 1210, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi 
was able to whip up a spontaneous raid against Frankish territory with the pro-martyrdom 
story of Abu Qudama, a ninth century military leader against the Byzantines, who told of 
a Medinan women who sent her hair into the “jihad” as reigns for his horse, and who was 
overjoyed at the news of her son’s martyrdom in the fighting.41  Sibt al-Jawzi reported of 
1229 that “the news of the handing over of Jerusalem to the Franks arrived and all hell 
broke loose in all the lands of Islam.”42 
Despite popular support, anti-Frankish jihad by the leaders and the army would 
have to wait for the 1250s and the Mamluk dynasty.  The Mamluks enthusiastically 
embarked on jihad against both the Franks and the Mongols, and even against the 
Christians of Armenia.  In 1291, after listening to a full recitation of the Qur’an, the 
Mamluk Sultan al-Ashraf marched on Acre, the last Frankish stronghold, and expelled 
the Franks from the Dar al-Islam. 
G. LASTING EFFECTS? 
Anti-Frankish jihad rhetoric and feeling began in earnest after a decade of 
Frankish occupation and reached its peak in the mid-twelfth century, but that the feeling 
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never fully took priority over local rivalries and other political considerations until the 
Mamluk era.  Even at its previous height, during Saladin’s control over Egypt and Syria, 
as much or more military effort was spent on fellow Muslims as upon Crusader armies 
and holdings.  So what was the sum of all this rhetoric? 
Most scholars see the anti-Christian propaganda of this era as religious scholars’ 
attempts to convince rulers to wage jihad.43  Others see it as aimed at the Muslim 
population, “encouraging resistance to the Frankish presence while simultaneously 
fostering intensified fidelity to Islam.”44  While not universally recognized by either 
rulers or the Muslim population, it resonated with both.  The extensive thought and 
writing that went into the philosophy of jihad in this era re-awoke the centrality of both 
jihad and Jerusalem to Islam.  These issues seem once again to have dwindled in 
importance as the cultural impetus waned. They were little noted among Arabs during the 
Ottoman era, as jihad, when taking place, was outside Arab lands, and Jerusalem once 
again became a relative backwater. Under recent conditions, however, both Jerusalem 
and jihad have re-kindled as issues of extreme importance in relations between Islam and 
the West.  As for bitter reflection on an unprovoked and barbarous attack, this seems not 
to be found, even during the height of the jihad movement.  Twelfth century Damascene 
Ibn Qalanisi, who had no use for his Frankish neighbors and consistently couched war 
against them as jihad, had little to say on the subject of what are now highly referenced 
atrocities.  Of the siege of Ma’arra, for example, he makes no reference to the Crusader 
cannibalism that so horrified Fulcher of Chartres, saying only that “their supplies of food 
were exhausted, and they were reduced to eating carrion.”45  Of the taking of Jerusalem 
and the oft referenced massacre of its inhabitants, while Ibn al-Qalanisi does relate the 
tale of the burning of the Jews in their synagogue, of the other inhabitants, he says only  
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that “a great host were killed.”46  Contrast this with the more horrific description from 
Raymond of Aguilers who referred to seeing “piles of heads, hands, and feet...in the 
houses and the streets.”47 
One might think that the Arab memory of the Crusades would be seen as one of 
triumph, but a more common interpretation is one of loss and seeing Islam as having 
suffered bullying from the West.  While the sources attempting to evoke Arab bitterness 
over this era point to many Frankish actions that could be sources of ill-will, they never 
successfully explain the scarcity of outrage about these actions at the time, nor the many 
examples of Frankish-Islamic cooperation throughout the era.  It is also interesting to 
note that, although the Western invaders are “Franks” throughout the medieval Muslim 
chronicles, they are consistently “Crusaders” (selibyeen) in modern Arabic narrative. This 
points to a distinct change in attitude that has great importance for modern Muslim 
bitterness about, and reaction to, the Crusades.  Indeed, it is telling that it is the Raymond 
of Aguilers version of the taking of Jerusalem that is common in modern Arabic histories.  
The Arabic edition of Philip Hitti’s “The Arabs: A Short History,” relates of the taking of 
Jerusalem that “swords were used on men, women, and children without exception, ‘until 
a profusion of heads, hands, and legs were seen in the streets and squares of the city.’“48  
As we will see in the following chapter, not only narrative description, but the very 
concept of the Crusades as a discrete historical event, come from Western sources. 
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III. “THE CRUSADES” ENTER ARABIC DISCOURSE 
While military campaigns that would later be known as part of the Crusades 
continued to be chronicled in Arabic sources for hundreds of years after the Crusading 
era ended, the Crusades as a unified historical occurrence remained foreign to Arab 
conceptions of history until the modern era.  In the mid-nineteenth century, increasing 
ties between France, which had declared itself protector of Catholics within the Ottoman 
Empire as early 1638 and Arab Christians, particularly Maronites, in the Levant, brought 
the concept of the Crusades into Arabic historical discourse. 
A. THE FRANCO-MARONITE CONNECTION 
1. Ties of Economy and Protection 
The Crusades’ entry into Arab discourse came in the context of competition 
between Maronites and Druze in that portion of the Levant now known as Lebanon.  
Significant economic ties between Mount Lebanon and Europe date back to the reign of 
emir Fakhr al-Din (1585-1635), who encouraged the cultivation of silk (sericulture) and 
established trading links with Tuscany and France.  As was customary throughout the 
Ottoman Empire’s economic relations with European powers, the French did business 
under Capitulation treaties and predominantly through religious minorities.  In this case, 
of course, their protégés were the Maronites.  In 1638, France had declared itself the 
protector of Catholics within the Ottoman Empire and in 1658 appointed the head of the 
Maronite Khazin family as “vice-consul of France in Beirut, with the permission of the 
Porte.”49 
From the seventeenth century onwards, French economic involvement in Lebanon 
grew continually.  These trends accelerated greatly in the early nineteenth century with 
the invention of the Jacquard loom, drastically increasing the French market for raw silk, 
and again in the mid-century when the domestic French raw silk production was hit by 
silkworm disease.50  The silk trade and the connections that came with it were to have 
enormous societal implications, not least of which was the Maronite expansion into the 
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previously Druze-dominated region known as the Shuf.  Druze landholders welcomed the 
additional hands to work their suddenly profitable lands, and, at this time, sectarian 
differences were more an administrative curiosity than a danger.  As sericulture became 
more and more profitable, however, the increased economic power of Maronite peasants 
and merchants led both to their restlessness under Druze control and to Druze resentment 
of their riches. 
These economic tensions were exacerbated in the nineteenth century by the 
tumultuous reign of Bashir Shihab II, a Maronite emir who ruled over Mount Lebanon 
(for the most part) from 1788-1840.   His 1825 arrest and strangulation of the Druze emir 
Bashir Janbalat may have made him the unquestioned ruler of Mount Lebanon, but it also 
violently introduced sectarianism into Lebanese politics.  The Druze saw this act as that 
of “a Christian Shihab enemy bent on destroying the Druzes.”51  It was his support of 
Mehmet Ali’s son Ibrahim Pasha during the Egyptian invasion and occupation of Syria 
from 1831-1840 that brought European influence into the contentious politics of Mount 
Lebanon.  As Bashir had “openly sided with them [the Egyptians] against his Ottoman 
overlords when they attacked Syria and complied with their requests for tax levies and 
arms,”52 he was unsurprisingly deposed and exiled when the Ottomans regained control 
of Syria, with European assistance.   
Bashir’s deposal left a power vacuum that both Druze and Maronites scrambled to 
fill.  Neither group hesitated to appeal to European sponsors to influence the Ottoman 
court on their behalf.  The Druze sought British support in sectarian terms, offering to 
“deliver up their Country to the protection of Great Britain,”53 and the Maronites 
similarly appealed to the French in the name of Christian brotherhood.54  It was in the  
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context of this Maronite appeal to French sensibilities that new interpretations of history, 
including the popular European conception of the Crusades, entered Arab (though not yet 
Arabic) historiography. 
2. Maronite Re-invention of History 
The first, and most overt, Maronite attempt to reinvent the past to support current 
goals was Bishop Murad’s “history” published in 1844.  His Notice historique sur 
l’origine de la nation Maronite et sur ses rapports avec la France, sur la nation Druze et 
sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban sought to create a shared identity with its 
“guardian angel,” France, in whose language the book was written and to whose king it 
was addressed,55 and to create legitimacy for Maronite claims over Mount Lebanon.  
Murad presented the Maronite “nation” as a hold-out against the Saracens in their 
mountain fastness, later joined by Druze who, while they had performed some services 
for the Shihab emirs, were inherently backward, fanatical, and lazy. Makdisi’s analysis is 
particularly apt: 
By creating this absolute distinction between Maronite and Druze and by 
conveniently presenting the Maronites as the original possessors of the 
land to which the Druzes were latecomers, Murad was not only 
legitimating the Maronite Church’s position on restoration but was also 
reworking Maronite identity, casting it in imaginary national sectarian 
terms that totally excluded the Druzes.  Loyal to France and to the 
Crusaders, loyal to the idea and existence of Christianity in the Orient, and 
on the front line between Christendom and barbarism, Murad’s Maronites 
urgently needed French assistance in the troubled post restoration times.  
“Lebanon,” he wrote, is “like another French land,” and France was the 
“seconde patrie des Maronites.” To add scientific evidence to his various 
arguments, Murad concluded his narrative with appendices that explain 
the “genealogy of the [Christian] Princes of Lebanon” and that enumerated 
the different populations of Mount Lebanon in which the Maronites, of 
course, constituted the overwhelming majority.56 
 
For the first time, an Arab history, though written in French and predominantly to 
influence a French audience, included the concept of the Crusades.  Why did Bishop 
Murad choose this particular frame?  Because in the mid-nineteenth century it resonated 
                                                 
55 Asher Kaufman, “'Tell Us Our History': Charles Corm, Mount Lebanon and Lebanese 
Nationalism.” Middle East Studies 40, no. 3, (2004): 1-28. 
56 Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, 82-83. 
24 
very favorably with its intended audience.  This was the era of European romantic re-
interpretation of the Crusades, which were seen almost universally favorably.  In an era 
of dynamic expansion and “civilizing missions,” the Crusades were presented in Europe 
as an early example of selfless devotion to combating evil at the cost of great hardship.  
The popular European conception of the Crusades at the time is typified by Sir Walter 
Scott’s immensely popular 1820 work of historical fiction, Ivanhoe, in which the hero is 
presented as the pinnacle of chivalry, a penniless knight-errant returned from years of 
combat in the Third Crusade.  In contrast, the villain is a rich Templar knight who lives 
off the  donations that the pious public have offered to support the Crusades, yet fails to 
live up to their high ideals.   
This popular conception found its reflection in the academic work of the time as 
well.  The French historian Francois Guizot wrote in 1828 that “the crusades constitute 
the heroic event of modern Europe,” presenting the movement as a “popular, national, 
and European impulsion” that seemingly foreshadowed national representative 
government.57  In his estimation, the Crusades were driven by “the impulsion of religious 
sentiment and creeds” that called for struggle against “Mahommedanism” and by the 
restlessness of a society recently turned sedentary, for which “the wandering life had 
ceased, but not the inclination for its excitement and adventures.”58  With such positive 
connotations, Bishop Murad had chosen a powerful presentation of Maronites as both 
inherently European and as the most faithful adherents to an epic struggle.  As the 
Crusades meant little to nothing to his Arab and Druze neighbors at the time, presenting 
the Maronites as having been on the “other side” was a risk free strategy. 
Within fifteen years, Bishop Murad’s concepts made their way into a Maronite 
work in the Arabic language.  Published in 1859, Tanyus Shidyaq, a Maronite of the 
Hadduth clan, published Kitab Akhbar al-a`yan fi Jabal Lubnan (History of the Great 
Families of Mount Lebanon), which contains what appears to be the first documented use 
of the term “Crusades” (al-hurub as-selibiyah) in Arabic, though it is only a fleeting 
reference.  In his introduction, Shidyaq credits the possibly apocryphal work “History of 
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the Crusades and the role of the Maronites” (Tarikh  al-hurub as-selibiyah wa-dawr al-
Marouniin), attributed to seventeenth/eighteenth century Maronite Patriarch Estefan al-
Douihy.59  No further information could be found about this work, which may be 
Shidyaq’s invention of a title for one of Douihy’s works better known by another name.  
Douihy wrote ten known historical manuscripts, though none even close to the given title.  
According to Peitro Kheir, however, Douihi’s then unpublished work Series of Maronite 
Patriarchs includes a depiction of Maronites eagerly greeting the arriving Franks,60 
making it possible that this is Shidyaq’s source.  In any case, the use of the term in Arabic 
is a breakthrough. 
Shidyaq’s work is a family history of each of the notable families of Lebanon.  
While he does not use the term “Crusades” again in his work, he does reference the 
Maronites, and especially the Murad family, as ardent supporters of their brother 
Christian Franks from 1099 through their expulsion in 1291.    In his narrative, the Murad 
family is given a French progenitor in a (certainly apocryphal)  French community in 
Tripoli prior to the Arab conquest of the Levant.  At the time of the conquest, the Murad 
Bishop had moved his people to the mountains to protect them from the rising tide of 
Islam.61  In 1099, the Maronites are presented as gleefully greeting the arriving Franks.  
In 1250, when Louis IX arrived in Syria, emir Murad is represented as sending his son 
and 25,000 fighters to the king’s aid.  In response, Shidyaq claims, Louis adopted the 
Maronites as “French.”  Shidyaq then chronicles the Mamluk conquest of Acre, with long 
descriptions of Muslim atrocities, until all of the fortresses and coastal towns were taken 
by 1290 (in Shidyaq’s narrative, but 1291 according to most historians).  Finally, with all 
of the other Christians expelled, Shidyaq describes a momentous attack on the Maronites 
of Kasrawan by “all the Muslims in the area,” but the outnumbered Maronites prevail.62   
The family resemblance between this work and Bishop Murad’s is clear, but 
Shidyaq was clearly writing for a local audience of notables.  In addition to his 
hagiographic treatment of the Murad family, he wrote similar chapters about families of 
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other religions, for example claiming descent from Abu Bakr for the Shihab family and 
presenting their puissance in battle against the Franks.63  Great deeds during the 
Crusades were now part of a self-invention of history, and not just for external 
consumption. 
3. The Catholic Printing Press in Beirut 
The French interest in the Crusades, and their influence on Arab conceptions 
thereof, is born out in the publications of the French Jesuit supervised Impremerie 
Catholique in Beirut.  Two publications edited by the Jesuit Priest Louis Cheikho 
illustrate this process.  In 1906, the Impremerie Catholique released Un Dernier Écho des 
Croisades (A Final Echo of the Crusades), a collection of Arabic manuscripts extracted 
from the chronicles of various Muslim historians, most particularly Salih ibn Yahya, 
dealing with the Mamluk invasion of Crete.  With the exception of the title and the 
introduction, both of which are in French, this book is entirely in Arabic and quotes the 
original manuscripts directly.  The word “Crusades” is found nowhere in any of these 
manuscripts, the most recent of which was that of Ibn Sahim az-Zahiri from 1894 and all 
of which continue the tradition of referring to “the Franks.”.  Nonetheless, in Father 
Cheikho’s estimation, the invasion of Crete, whose ruler still styled himself “King of 
Jerusalem,” was clearly the last act in a sweeping Crusade narrative, and as such it is 
presented.   
In 1927, Father Cheikho presided over the publication of another work based on 
the chronicles of Ibn Yahya, Kitab Ta’rikh Bayrut (The Book of the History of Beirut).  
This work is entirely in Arabic, and, while those portions that are direct quotes of Ibn 
Yahya continue to use the term “Franks,” the publishers are not shy about the use of the 
terms “Crusades” and “Crusader,” which by now are assumed to be clear to a general 
Arabic speaking audience.  In the introduction, the publishers reference both the title of 
their previous work, Un Dernier Écho des Croisades, in Arabic and that it deals with 
“French princes of Cyprus from the progeny of the Crusader Lusignans.”64  Further, they 
write of Ibn Yahya’s manuscript, “One of the best things about this book is that it 
                                                 
63 Shidyaq, Kitab Akhbar al-a`yan fi Jabal Lubnan, 44-45. 
64 Salih Ibn Yahya,, called Ibn Buhtur, and Louis Cheikho, and Hamzah ibn Ahmad Ibn Asbat. Kitab 
Ta’rikh Bayrut. (Beirut: Impremerie Catholique, 1927), 3. (author’s translation from the Arabic) 
27 
mentions numerous matters pertaining to the French Crusader princes and their glorious 
deeds on these shores.”65  The term shows up again in the body of the text. Under the 
discussion of the various conquerors of Beirut, from the first Muslim forces in 635, the 
Fatamids in 1014, Mustansir in 1057, and the Franks in 1118, the publishers included a 
note that for more information on Beirut during the era “between the time of Arslan and 
the Crusaders, see our book Beirut, its History and Relics.”66  Parenthetically, for all that 
Father Cheikho had previously presented the invasion of Crete as an episode of the 
Crusades, this more complete collection of Ibn Yahya’s writings on the subject shows 
that he presented the entire affair as being instigated by Basque pirates.  The Franco-
Catholic interest in the Crusades is clear in the presentation given these works, and by the 
time of the second, the use and general understanding of the term is implicit. 
B. FIRST ARABIC HISTORIES OF THE CRUSADES 
1. Patriarch Mazlum’s History 
The tale of the first history of the Crusades written in Arabic is shrouded in 
academic mystery.  No copies are available for viewing, at least without considerable 
further research and perhaps a trip to Jerusalem. The original Western source is unknown 
to current scholarship, and even its author’s name is doubtful.  There is also confusion as 
to the Arabic translator.  This study will endeavor to clear up some of this confusion and 
offer a solution to this mystery.  According to Emmanuel Sivan, “a ‘History of the Holy 
Wars in the East, otherwise called the Wars of the Cross,’ translated into Arabic from 
French, appeared in Jerusalem in 1865, bearing the imprimatur of the Patriarch of the 
Holy City.”67  In his endnote to this statement, he cites “M. Monrond, Ta’rikh al-hurub 
al-muqaddasa fi-l-mashriq al-mad’uwwa harb al-salib, transl M. Mazlum.”68  This 
reference is widely cited69, but no one has shed any further light on what the original 
source of this work may be.  In the course of researching the work of Hariri (as discussed 
                                                 
65  Ibn Yahya, Kitab Ta’rikh Bayrut, 3.  
66  Ibid, 18. (author’s translation from the Arabic) 
67 Emmanuel Sivan, Modern Arab Historiography of the Crusades (Kfar Chabad: Tel-Aviv 
University, 1973), 10. 
68 Ibid, 55. 
69 eg, Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 592. and Edward Peters, “The Firanj are 
Coming--Again,” Orbis, 48, no.1 (2004) 3-17.7.  Both of these citations further cloud the issue by 
attributing to Sivan's  “M. Mazlum” the full name Muhammad Mazlum.  
28 
below, the first Muslim to write a history of the Crusades), one finds in his list of 
references “The History of the Holy Wars, which Maximus Mazlum translated into 
Arabic.”70  This makes it clear that the referenced work was not simply printed under the 
imprimatur of the Patriarch, but was actually translated by Maximus III Mazlum, Melkite 
Patriarch of Jerusalem from 1833 through 1855, though it was apparently published 
posthumously.  While Maximus is best known for having achieved recognition for the 
Melkites as separate millet within the Ottoman Empire and adding the Sees of Antioch 
and Alexandria to that of Jerusalem, prior to his election as Patriarch, he accomplished 
several translations of religious works from Italian into Arabic, so further translation 
efforts are unsurprising. 
As for the source work itself, it is likely that the spelling of the author’s name as 
“Monrond” is a result of the transliteration into Arabic, and subsequent re-transliteration 
into the Latin alphabet, of the French “Montrond.”  While no known authors of the era 
bear the surname “Monrond,” Maxime de Montrond was a prolific French author of 
popular histories in the mid-nineteenth century.   Although no copies could be located, 
one of his cited works was Historie des Croisades, published in Paris in 1840.71  The 
context of the citation makes it clear that Montrond’s work discussed positive 
relationships between the Crusaders and the indigenous Christians and thus makes it a 
likely candidate for translation by Patriarch Maximus III Mazlum.  While this cannot be 
conclusively proven without a comparative reading of each text, it appears that the first 
Arabic language history of the Crusades was Patriarch Maximus III’s translation of 
Maxime de Montrond’s Historie des Croisades, published in Jerusalem in 1865.  
Although the very mystery surrounding this work shows its limited impact on the Arab 
world, it did serve as a source for Western conceptions of the Crusades for Hariri, for 
whom it was the only Western source cited. 
2. The First Arab Muslim History of the Crusades 
This interest in the Crusades, inspired by the interaction between Europeans, 
especially the French, and levantine Christians, finally made it’s way into the Arab 
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Muslim conception in 1899, when Sayyid `Ali Hariri published his groundbreaking Kitab 
al-akhbar al-saniyah fi al-Hurub al-Salibiyah (Book of the Splendid Stories of the 
Crusades) in Cairo in 1899.  As his introduction indicates, the concept of the Crusades 
already had resonance among Turkish court circles, for the Sultan had previously made 
reference to European-Ottoman interaction as being a new form of Crusade.  This 
statement bought no response from Arabs, Hariri seems convinced, because the concept 
meant little to them.  Thus, he set out to rectify that situation and wrote his work to 
educate Arab speakers about the Crusades as a distinct occurrence.  His goals are clear in 
his introduction: 
For what follows, the importance of the Crusades, which happened during 
the bygone era, is not hidden from everyone.  The Popes and clerics 
incited the people of Europe to attack the Muslims, and the Crusaders 
hurried to seize Syria with the goal of removing Jerusalem from the hands 
of Islam.  Following that came a unification of the Muslims and  the 
removal of the Crusaders from the land and the difficulties, failures, ruin, 
and confusion that those Crusaders faced. 
It is given that the Kings of Europe are now colluding against our country 
(may God protect it) such that it resembles what those gone by had done.  
Therefore, our great Sultan, our most exhaled Khakhan, he who is 
protected by the double lion, Abd al-Hamid II, said that Europe is once 
again waging a Crusading war on us, in a political form.  Since the 
community of Arabic readers don’t have a book in our language that 
encompasses the wars of the Crusades so that we can know the truth about 
them, though we can find bits about them in books of history, free of any 
information about their reasons, their intentions, their outcome, etc., I took 
up this book, which I named ‘The Splendid Stories of the Crusades.’  I 
took a precise interest in writing this comprehensive book of the eight 
Crusader wars, elucidating each of these wars singularly, clarifying its 
reasons and instigators and the travel of its military forces and what the 
Crusaders did by way of fighting the Muslim Kings.  I have also clarified 
the history of the Kings of Islam from the era of these wars who had 
interaction with the Crusaders from the year 490 hijri until the year 690 
hijri, in which the Crusaders were driven out of Syria, in a simple manner, 
free of complexity and boring prolixity.72 
 
The general narrative of Hariri’s book is an interesting contrast of long portions of 
classical Arab chronicles quoted in extenso for those stories of the related to the Crusades 
                                                 
72 Hariri, Kitab al-akhbar al-saniyah fi al-Hurub al-Salibiyah, 2-3. (author's translation from the 
Arabic)  
30 
that had been covered by these sources, and portions that read as though they are 
similarly quoted from non-academic Western sources of the era.73  The writing style 
changes considerably between the two, but it is most telling that those passages taken 
from older Arabic sources consistently use the term “Franks,” whereas the rest of the 
book uses the term “Crusaders” throughout.  
Hariri was writing in a time when Egypt, while nominally still part of the 
Ottoman Empire, was under the de facto control of Great Britain.  By 1876, Britain and 
France had assumed considerable control over Egypt’s economy under the Debt 
Commission.  In 1882, Britain intervened in the Urabi uprising of Arab nativist officers 
and occupied Egypt.  While this was all done in the name of khedive Tawfiq, and British 
control remained, technically, “assistance,” British domination of Egypt was firmly 
entrenched.  Hariri’s dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is clear in his introduction, 
both above and in his entreaty on behalf of the Sultan. 
I beseech God, creator of the heavens and earth, of the sincere heart, to 
bring the ‘High State’74 eternal power and eternal victory, such that the 
Ottomans and the Muslims live forever in sovereignty and exaltation, and 
that He may protect His Majesty the Great Sultan and Caliph, the greatest 
of the Ghazi,75 Abd al-Hamid II, and that He [God] protect Egypt under 
the shade of His Majesty.76 
Although Hariri presents himself as an Ottoman nationalist in this introduction, 
his presentation of the Crusades appears more a sort of proto-Egyptian nationalism.  His 
account of the Crusades concentrates on the role of Saladin as a “Golden Age” hero, not 
just of Muslims, but of Egypt in particular. Here, Hariri benefits considerably from 
Western sources, which had long since made of Saladin the “flower of Saracen Chivalry” 
and noble foil to Richard the Lion-Hearted.  He relates several of the favorite Western 
tales of Saladin likely found in Mazlum’s translated French history, such as the 
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apocryphal exchange of letters between Richard the Lion-Hearted and Saladin 
negotiating over the status of Jerusalem and the True Cross that Saladin reportedly 
captured when he took Jerusalem. In this exchange, Hariri quotes Saladin’s letter as 
stating 
Jerusalem is for us as it is to you, and the country was ours by origin.  
Your conquest befell it because of the weakness of the Muslims at that 
time.  As for the true cross, its destruction is a great opportunity for us, 
impermissible for us to neglect it unless for some reason beneficial to 
Islam.77 
 
As well as presenting Saladin as a hero of both Islam and Egypt, Hariri 
consistently presents Egypt as a natural independent unit, an attack on which was an 
attack on “the Egyptians.”  This calls for a certain amount of mental agility; when 
considering the Ayyubids, Hariri considers the conquest of Fatamid Egypt by Nur ad-
Din’s general Asad al-Din “attacking the Egyptians,”78 whereas the actions of Asd al-
Din’s successor and nephew Saladin are construed as working for Egypt’s 
independence.79   Hariri similarly excises much of the hostility towards the Fatamids 
found in many of the period chronicles he quotes from.  While the Fatamids are 
referenced as Shia (using the terms alawi and mehdi’in), he avoids calling them Isma’eili, 
a term he reserves for the Assassins.  While the Assassins of Damascus are presented as 
allies of the Franks, the Fatamid Caliphs are, like their Sunni counterparts given the title 
“Protector of God’s Religion.”80 
Hariri’s interpretive readings of his sources are far from flagrant, but they do 
indicate that even in this first Arab history of the Crusades written by a Muslim and 
incorporating both Arabic and Western accounts, the current context was influencing the 
presentation.  This phenomenon would accelerate greatly as Crusade references began to 
be more familiar and emerging contexts gave them increased resonance.  Hariri’s work 
served as both a springboard and a foreshadowing of later, more polemic histories. 
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IV . THE CRUSADES IN MODERN ARAB HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The early twentieth century was an era in which Arab authors spent little time on 
the Crusades.  This is surprising, as it was this era that included the British formalization 
of their colonial status in Egypt, Allied Powers’ war against the Ottoman Empire (and, 
thus, the technical Caliph), and France’s 1920 invasion of Syria and deposition of King 
Faisal, assumption of mandate control, and creation of the independent and majority 
Christian state of Lebanon. However, as much as these actions may seem likely 
candidates for analysis as parallel to the Crusades, this concept was not yet well enough 
established in the Arab world to resonate.  Instead, the parallels came from the colonial 
powers, who spread Crusade allusions widely.   
Among the most widely reported of these allusions, the two best known are those 
of General Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem in 1917 and General Gouraud’s capture of 
Damascus in 1920.  It is almost certainly apocryphal that Allenby remarked on his entry 
to Jerusalem that “today the Crusades are over.” Certainly his memoirs contain no such 
quote, nor do any press reports at the time.  That said, however, Crusade allusions to the 
campaign were all through the British popular press.  The first, and most overt, of these 
was the publication in Punch magazine just a week after Allenby’s entry, a cartoon 
showing Richard the Lion-Hearted looking down from heaven upon the scene in 
Jerusalem and commenting happily, “At last, my dream comes true.”81  There is more 
evidence for the tale of General Gouraud’s conquest of Damascus, after which he was 
said to have visited Saladin’s tomb, kicked it and declared “Awake, Saladin! We have 
returned,” though the exact words are not recorded.  Neither of these incidents drew 
widespread comment from the Arab Muslim population at the time, for whom the 
Crusades were a relatively obscure concept.  With a few decades of colonial rule to 
absorb the new vision of history, and then the sudden prospect of the creation of the state 
of Israel to draw new parallels, Arab histories of the Crusades proliferated, and colonial 
and Zionist parallels became the dominant interpretation.   
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A. ARAB NATIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CRUSADES 
The study of the Crusades became an important part of Arab academic writing 
after World War II and continues to be a popular subject to this day.  The dominant 
viewpoint has been through the lens of Arab nationalism, and several themes have 
predominated in interpreting the Crusades.  The most ubiquitous of these themes is the 
drawing of parallels between the Crusades and colonialism and/or the establishment of 
Israel.  Also common to these works is the issue of Arab unity.  In earlier works, the 
Crusades are seen both as a symptom of lack of unity and as a triumph for “regained” 
unity.  This offered a clear road map to victory for Arabs of the day.  Thus, in Hasan 
Habashi’s view in his 1947 work Nur ad-Din and the Crusaders: The Islamic Revival and 
Convergence Movement in the Sixth Century Hijri,82 success came for the Arabs after 
Nur ad-Din unified Syria, Egypt, and northern Iraq under one polity, forming an example 
of how “the occurrences of the Middle Ages in the Near East show how these countries 
were able to defend themselves against the dangers of the Crusader forces.”83  As the 
dream of Arab Unity drifted away, the dark lessons of disunity continued to be 
emphasized, but the triumphant power of unity was less often invoked as the notion of 
Arab defeat of Israel became, perhaps, less realistic.  The imagined consequences of the 
Crusades play a large role throughout the literature, that similarly seems more one sided 
as the hoped for reversal of relative power for the Arabs fails to materialize.  The modern 
Arab historiography of the Crusades is both consciously and subconsciously 
contemporary in nature.   Not only do the authors explicitly draw parallels and lessons 
about current affairs, but the image of the current state of affairs influences the lens of 
implicit interpretation. 
1. Post World War II 
Four works make up this study’s sample of Arab histories of the Crusades written 
between the end of World War II and the Suez Crisis of 1956.  The first is Habashi’s 
1947 study of Nur ad-Din quoted above.  In the same year, Habashi published another 
book, entitled The First Crusade.84 Between these two works, he covers the period from 
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1099-1174.  His works were followed in 1949 by ‘Abd al-Latif Hamzah’s Literature of 
the Crusades,85 which was followed in turn by Juzif Yusif’s Louis the Ninth in the Middle 
East, 1250-1253 A.D.: The Plight of Palestine in the Age of the Crusades.86    
Habishi: Nur ad-Din and the Crusaders 
Habashi’s work was written before the partition of Palestine and thus, rather than 
looking at a specific contemporary problem, he concentrates his interpretation on the 
virtues of the “unified Islamic front,”87 which is implicitly Arab.  The fact that his Golden 
Age hero, Nur ad-Din, is a Seljuk Turk is glossed over.  He is more interested in how his 
hero is presented by history. In Habashi’s view, Muslim chroniclers of the era over-
emphasized Nur ad-Din’s religious side, spending too much of their chronicles discussing 
his efforts to solve and mediate religious issues within his territory, which makes it seem 
as though he didn’t have much concern over “the violent struggle between East and West, 
the appearance of the Latin principalities in the East, and the Muslim’s efforts to extirpate 
these principalities.”88   The Christian authors, on the other hand, had it right when they 
presented Nur ad-Din as an epic enemy.  Of course, being on the wrong side, they tended 
to demonize him.  Habishi is particularly concerned here with getting the “right blend” 
that shows Nur ad-Din as both a pious leader of the community and a heroic unifier and 
enemy of the Crusaders. 
Habishi’s primary Western source is Stevenson’s 1907 work, Crusaders in the 
East, an already somewhat dated study, notable mostly for its early attempts to put 
together a history of the Crusader states using significant Arab sources and for its 
hagiographic depictions of Saladin.  While Habashi’s extensive use of this source in 1947 
is not of particular note, we will see that Stevenson continues to be a heavily cited source 
throughout the works included in this study, long past the era of any academic credibility 
for this work in Western academe.  It is likely that Stevenson continues in use so long 
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because his romantic presentation of Saladin resonates much more favorably than more 
modern Western studies that provide more nuanced approaches. 
Hamzah: Literature of the Crusades 
Hamzah’s work, published shortly after al-nakba (“the disaster,” the 
contemporary Arab term for the 1948 Arab-Israeli War), shows the immediate effect this 
event had on interpreting the Crusades.    He opens his book with  
In this afflicted age in our Egyptian modern history, a violent crisis is 
passing among us, which this generation have dealt with and perhaps 
future generations will as well.  This crisis is our struggle on behalf of 
Palestine, hoping for its freedom from the covetousness of the Jews.89 
Hamzah self consciously approaches the Crusades as a representative of the Arabs 
and conflates the Crusades with Palestine in no uncertain terms. 
This crisis has awakened the intellect to the Crusades.  Cultured people in 
all the Arab countries have begun to want to know something about the 
history of this religious war, and about its Arab literature.  And that is 
what led me to answer this desire for the entire kingdom of the Arabic 
language in Egypt....I am happy to dedicate this book to the martyrs who 
died on behalf of Palestine and wrote upon its land with their blood, 
inscribing a page from among the pages of Arab gallantry and military 
honor. May God the Highest grant success to the first jihad of His 
Majesty, King Farouk, and guide the steps of his brother Arab Kings and 
presidents so their jihad bears fruit and they all realize their hopes.90 
  
As well as clarifying the parallels between the Crusades, whose Latin 
principalities “resembled a foreign patch on the garment of the Muslim world,”91 and the 
new patch which he hopes can soon be excised, Hamzah’s comments mark him as part of 
the “Arab Awakening” based in a resurgent Arabic language literature.  In his estimate, 
the poems of the era, written in Arabic, express the true feelings of the truly Arab masses 
who demanded action against the Crusaders, as opposed to the official court letters that 
were written for political purposes.92  Sivan has justifiably taken issue with this 
assessment, as almost all poetry of the era was written under court patronage and “a great                                                  
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deal of the poems of Jihad took the form of panegyrics (madih) or were composed 
according to explicit instructions of the poet’s patrons and served the latter’s immediate 
political purposes.”93   
Hamzah’s take on Arab poetry of the era is one of many ways that Arab 
nationalist interpretations of the Crusades tended to “Arabize” the “Counter-Crusade” 
jihad.  These poems are presented as evidence that the Arab masses were the driving 
force behind the “popular revival movement in the Muslim countries to do away with the 
Crusaders in some of their regions.”94  While the military leadership of the (as we have 
seen in the period sources) “on-again, off-again” jihad was entirely non-Arab, the 
argument is that the leadership may have dragged their feet, but the masses were steadfast 
and pushed their leaders towards action.  Even Yusif, whose work, aside from its title and 
a brief mention in the introduction of the Crusades as “one among many episodes in the 
long struggle between East and West of which history is overfull from the earliest ages 
until our current days,”95 seems mostly value-neutral, supports this interpretation of an 
Arab masses-driven jihad.  In a claim not supported by any known period account of the 
incident, Yusif asserts that popular indignation at the notion pressured the Mamluks to 
break off peace negotiations with Louis IX.96 
A final aspect of the Crusades whose interpretation begins in the post-World War 
II literature is that of the reasons for the initiation of the Crusades.  Most sources do 
accept the claims of period Western sources that mistreatment of Christian pilgrims to the 
Holy Land lead to the Crusades as a factor, but as one expects of historians, they also 
sought other factors to explain the movement.   These early interpretations offer a variety 
of factors, which, we will see, become more dominated by claims of colonial goals in 
later works.  Hamzah offers six factors that lead to the Crusades, only one of which 
seems directly parallel to colonialism.  According to his account, the Crusades were 
influenced by: 1) Seljuk treatment of Christian pilgrims; 2) Princes and the Catholic 
Church wanting to find an outlet that would benefit them for the “general warlike 
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activities that European countries experienced as a result of the feudal and chivalric 
systems;” 3) a wish to solve overpopulation in Europe; 4) hopes to benefit materially 
from the founding of the Crusader states, especially among the Italian merchants who 
supplied shipping; 5) “the desire of the slaves [serfs] to rid themselves of the shadow of 
control, for they were oppressed by the feudal system;” and 6) a response to the Seljuk 
conquest of Christian lands in Armenia and Byzantium which upset the Roman Catholic 
Church.97   While Hamzah provides no citation for this enumeration, it seems to be a 
paraphrase of Stevenson’s account of the motivating factors behind the Crusades.98  Of 
these, only number four sounds like colonialism, and general hostility to Islam is not 
found at all.  These two interpretations become conventional in later works.   
2. After the “Tripartite Aggression” 
In 1952, the Free Officers movement overthrew the British-supported King 
Farouk of Egypt, leading to the presidency of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, a staunch Arab 
Nationalist and opponent of colonialism.  In 1956, Nasser nationalized the privately (and 
mostly French and British) held Suez Canal company.  This nationalization led to 
extreme tension between Britain and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other, 
eventually leading to military conflict.  Israel, already at loggerheads with Egypt, allied 
with Britain and France, and the three attacked Egypt jointly, with Israel invading on 29 
October 1959, and Britain and France joining in two days later, after their “offer” to 
occupy the area and separate the warring parties was rejected by Nasser.  International 
pressure eventually forced all three parties to withdraw from Egyptian soil.  This attack, 
generally referred to as the “Suez Crisis,” is known in Egypt as the “Tripartite 
Aggression.” 
With attacks from the two great European powers and a Europe-supported 
“imposed state” in the Middle East, the Crusades parallels were obvious, and previous 
experience and writings had made the concept highly resonant.  The predictable response 
came quickly, with Charles Issawi’s publication of “Crusades and Current Crises in the 
Near East: A Historical Parallel” in the British magazine International Affairs in July of 
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1957.99 Issawi, a native speaker of Arabic, published a translated copy of his article in the 
same year in the Beirut magazine al-Abhath (research).   A similarly marked parallel was 
drawn by al-Kholi, in his historical novel The Tripartite Aggression in the Middle Ages 
(al-`Udwan al-thulathi fi al-`Usur al-Wusta);100 though, as a work of fiction, this work 
falls outside the scope of this study.  Two other works will join Issawi in illustrating the 
thrust of Arab Crusade scholarship between the Suez Crisis and the Six Day War, al-
Najjar’s 1962 work The Crusaders and Saladin101 and Ashur’s 1963 The Crusade 
Movement: Description of the History of the Arab Jihad in the Middle Ages.102 
Issawi: “Crusades and Current Crises in the Near East” 
Issawi, though of Cairene origin, was a professor of economics at Columbia 
University at the time of his article on Crusade-Suez Crisis parallels.  He thus 
unsurprisingly concentrated on economic factors involved in the disputes.  Nonetheless, 
many of the themes first introduced in the post-World War II literature find support here, 
many quoting Runciman’s well known (and at the time, the West’s cutting edge of 
Crusades research) A History of the Crusades.  Issawi weighs in on both the “Arabness” 
of the issue and the dangers of Arab disunity in his quote of Runciman that “It was, above 
all, the disunion of the Arabs that permitted the small intrusive state to be established in 
their lands.”103  That these lands are inherently Arab is accepted as given, even though 
Issawi proceeds to chronicle in the next paragraph the Fatamid seizure of “southern 
Palestine” from the Seljuk Turks, who had held it at the arrival of the Franks.  Issawi 
similarly participates in the lionization of Saladin and both his and the jihad’s 
“Arabization.” drawing triumphant parallels to modern Egypt. 
The next point of similarity is more fundamental.  It was pointed 
out that, under the shock of Crusader intrusion, the Arab states in Egypt 
and Syria coalesced under Salahuddin.  This process was not, however, a 
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mere dynastic union; it was part of a far reaching social change.  It 
involved the replacement of the luxury-loving, cultured, easygoing, 
tolerant Fatamids by stronger, more coarse-grained, more single-minded 
successors.  The change was consummated under the Mamalukes, a 
military caste whose primary interest was warfare....A similar change has 
taken place in Egypt from the supine, polished, luxury-loving society of 
the 1930s and 1940s to the rougher, healthier, less easy-going, more 
militaristic society of today.   
Moreover, in both cases, popular hostility to foreign intrusion was 
largely responsible for the change.104 
 
In support of his thesis of popular hostility, Issawi cites several examples, none 
taken from a period Arabic source, and includes Yusef’s apocryphal tale of popular 
pressure forcing the Mamluks to break off negotiations with Louis IX cited above.105  
Issawi is also the first to introduce the “draining effect” of the struggle against the 
Crusades, a thesis that becomes increasingly popular as modern low levels of relative 
power for the Arabs become more acute, or at least clearer. 
The Mamalukes succeeded in their main military objective, the 
expulsion of the Crusaders, but in the process they overstrained the 
economy of their country, sacrificing first agriculture and industry and 
then, as will be seen below, international trade.  The last years of their rule 
were marked by inflation, a decline in rates of exchange, and a fall in the 
standards of living and of culture.106 
 
Both current and future decline are shown as caused by the Crusades. 
The last parallelism is the most dramatic of all.  While the 
Moslems were fighting the Crusaders, a new and far greater danger began 
to loom on the horizon, the Mongol invasion....As Runciman put it: ‘But 
had it not been for the Crusaders, the Arabs would have been far better 
able to meet the Mongol aggression.  The intrusive Frankish State was a 
festering sore that the Moslems could never forget.  So long as it distracted 
them they could never wholly concentrate on other problems.’  As a result, 
although in desperate battle the Mamalukes later on preserved Egypt from 
the Mongol invasion, they could not save Iraq or Syria.  Al Musta’sim was 
slaughtered, together with scores of thousands of his subjects; his capital 
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was ruined, and Iraq was so thoroughly devastated that it did not recover 
for over six centuries.  Syria was wrecked only comparatively less.  One 
wonders whether, in this respect, history will repeat itself.107 
 
While Issawi doesn’t make his “possible greater enemy” clear (Perhaps the 
U.S.S.R.?), his estimate of the long-term negative effects of the Crusades for Islam would 
resonate highly.  Issawi’s conceptions seem largely taken from Runciman’s A History of 
the Crusades.   Runciman’s list of woes brought on by the Crusades is long and doleful, 
covering the last eight pages of his monumental work  and offering negative effects for 
Western Christendom, Islam (which he conflates neatly with Arab civilization), and most 
of all Eastern Christendom108  The rest of Runciman’s negative effects would soon be 
disputed by Arab scholars who argued for Western gain from the Crusades, but the 
notions of the Crusades as the birthplace of civilizational decline for the Arabs would 
only gain ground. 
Najar: The Crusaders and Saladin 
Najar’s book, while it adds little to the narrative, is the first to present the 
Crusades in a completely cynical light.  In his estimation, the goals of the Crusades were 
aimed at “material desires under a deceptive screen of religion.”109  He draws more 
implicit parallels to colonial economic exploitation than Hamzah’s above in his claims 
that the trading cities of the Mediterranean were in favor of the Crusades because they 
feared that the Seljuks would expand to the Mediterranean and squeeze them out of 
lucrative trade routes.110  Further, he offers as the primary goal of the Crusades “to take a 
region of Asia and all of its riches.”111  He also is an adherent of the long-term negative 
effects of the Crusades.  While he presents Saladin and his conquest of Jerusalem in a 
triumphant light, his overall assessment of the Crusades is that they are explanatory for  
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Arab disadvantage in the modern world, referring to “the Crusades which distressed the 
Muslim world for two complete centuries, and of which we still suffer from the effects to 
the current time.”112 
Ashur: The Crusade Movement 
If Najar’s book is moderate in its level of interpretation, Ashur’s is a polemic. To 
Ashur, the story of the Crusades is something of a morality play, offering important 
lessons in how to deal with current crises.  The parallels are all explicit and highly 
normative.  In Ashur’s estimation, studying the Crusades is important in order to “learn 
from mistakes of the past and avoid them in the future”113 in dealing with “the most 
important danger facing the Arab Nation today, Israel and its supporters, the regressive 
forces of colonialism.”114  Arab unity is paramount for Ashur, who saw the Crusades as 
succeeding in getting a foothold in “the heart of the Arab Nation” due to disunity, as “the 
appearance of weakness, political dissolution, and civilizational lingering really began 
after the Arab Nation was divided before the First Crusade began.”115  Thus Buyyid and 
Seljuk domination over the Arab Caliphate were the progenitors of weakness, and the 
Arab Nation became strong again with the appearance of the “unity movement,” when 
Arabs refused to “follow traitorous leaders.”116  These traitorous leaders, who 
“cooperated with the Crusaders against the unity movement” are presented as equivalent 
to those “cooperating with Israel against freedom groups.”117 And though the “Arab 
Nation saw many conspiracies against it” in the Crusade era, unity won out in the end, 
“returning the land to its Arab owners.”118 
To Ashur, the point of studying the Crusades is clear.  It aims towards “protecting 
the Arab’s rights, and the existence of Arabness, and to guarantee our children a free and 
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generous life in our great Arab Nation.”119  He presents the Crusaders as atrocity-prone 
invaders (quoting Western sources for the atrocities, as they were little remarked by the 
period Arab chroniclers) and then excuses any atrocities perpetrated by Muslim as 
retribution for the massacre at the taking of Jerusalem.120  While the Crusades are 
presented as the great victory of a Golden Age, the barbarity of the invader and the unfair 
results of the long struggle are highlighted.  In Ashur’s presentation, the Crusades led to 
destruction and long occupation for Arab countries, whereas Europe enjoyed the 
Renaissance “as a result of contact with the Arab Islamic civilization.”121 
Modern Arab historical presentations of the Crusades prior to the Six Day War 
left an interesting impression, strongly, and often explicitly, influenced by current 
realities.  Arab nationalism, the dominant ideology of the time, called for Arab unity, and 
the Crusades were presented in that light.  The Crusades were presented as a great victory 
of an heroic past, but they were also presented as a devastating attack that explained 
centuries of relative civilizational weakness.  The Crusades were thus a symbol of 
strength and of (past) weakness.  As battlefield defeat unfolded, past weakness became 
present weakness, and the vision more dolorous. 
3. After the Six Day War 
The crushing military defeat of the Six Day War also crushed the use of the 
Crusades as a blueprint for Arab victory.  In fact, the entire study of the Crusades went 
into a long silence.  Only one work published between 1968 and 1979 was discovered for 
examination in this study, M.A.M. Ahmad’s 1969 Egypt and Syria and the Crusaders. 122  
When the publication of works on the Crusades returns in 1980, those of nationalist 
influence offer a similar framework to those published previously, though the negative 
effects for the Arab world are magnified, and the triumphant confidence of victory is 
gone. 
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Ahmad: Egypt, Syria, and the Crusaders 
Ahmad’s lonely work offers little that is new.  It reads as though it were written 
during the era of the United Arab Republic, concentrating on the joint role of Egypt and 
Syria, “the heart of the Islamic world,” and their role “during the Crusades in protecting 
the Islamic inheritance.”123  There is something of the “stiff upper lip” and a bit more 
emphasis on religion here, as Ahmad presents Egypt and Syria as constant towards their 
religion and their Islamic nationality.  In Ahmad’s narrative, Egypt, with the help of 
Syria, was able to overcome “the forces of destruction and devastation” and to realize 
“God’s victory for those who are sincere in jihad in the path of God.”124   
Astal:  The Future of Israel 
A twenty-one year gap in new Arabic works on the Crusades comes to a close in 
1980 with Kamal al-Astal’s “The Future of Israel, between Extermination and 
Dissolution: A Study of the Historical Parallel between the Crusader Invasion and the 
Zionist Invasion.”125  Inspired by a university course on “Comparative Historical Studies 
Between the Crusader Invasion and the Zionist Invasion,” Astal’s article presents a 
hopeful argument for Arab nationalists.  In Astal’s view, Israel is doomed, even without 
direct military action, by structural factors that similarly doomed the Crusader states, 
such as a loss of European support, and the gradual development of a unified Arab front.   
It is possible to say that the international framework works against the 
future of Israel and that the local framework works against it, as well.  
Arab unity will occur and surround Israel in a direct relationship. 
Likewise, the universal system works against Israel, as it suffers from 
internal problems.126 
 
The vital factor in bringing this about is “realizing Arab unity, which is the hope 
of every loyal Arab who carries in the beat of his heart purity of origin and pride in his 
Arabness and his Arab Islamic culture.”127  
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Qasim: An Israeli view of the Crusades 
The next work on the Crusades published was Qasim’s An Israeli View of the 
Crusades,128 and, like Astals’s work above, is not so much a history of the Crusades as a 
study of Israel in relation to the Crusades.  He opens the book with an overview of the 
Crusades, however, which resembles those whose development this study has traced. For 
example, Qasim sees the Crusades as “aimed at the Arab Nation,”129 and states “colonial 
settlement was the greatest goal of the Crusading movement.”130 
In Qasim’s view, “even though the Crusades were primarily a confrontation 
between the Muslims and the Christians, Jewish researchers have taken a stance on the 
Crusades for themselves... which support[s] their Zionist political goals.”131  He identifies 
three main thrusts of Israeli re-interpretation of the Crusades: 1) an emphasis on 
Crusaders’ pre-departure acts of anti-Semitism, thus showing Jews as victims of the 
Crusades; 2) “Attempts to steal the Arab history in Palestine and the Arab lands” by 
means of claiming that the Jews owned the land and defended it against the Crusaders 
just as the Arabs did, thus legitimizing the Jewish right to Palestine; and 3) studying the 
Crusader phenomenon, especially the political reasons that led to its failure.132 
In addition to Qasim’s complaints about Israeli interpretation of the Crusades, he 
adds interpretation of his own, much like Astal’s thesis above.  In Qasim’s view, the 
“October War” of 1973 made it clear that Israel can’t survive without its European and 
American sponsors.  He draws a parallel between social changes in Europe which eroded 
support for the Crusader states and recent backlash against Israeli policies in the West.  
Qasim asserts that Israel is aware of this danger and is attempting to insulate itself by 
creating a local economic hegemony, a strategy for which Arabs are falling.133 
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After the works above that are as much about Israel as they are the Crusades, 
three more traditional histories will wrap up our analysis of mainstream Arab 
historiography of the Crusades: Ma’adiyah, et al’s 1986 work, The History of the Arab 
Nation and the Crusader Invasion;134 Hamidah’s 1990 publication The Crusades;135 and 
Jindi’s 2006 study Crusader Colonization in Palestine, 492-690h/1099-1291 A.D..136 
Ma’adiyah:  The History of the Arab Nation and the Crusader Invasion 
Ma’adiyah, et al’s work seems, both from its multiple authors and from its 
presentation, to have been written for use as a textbook, most likely in Syria.  The theme 
of the book is two-fold.  First, it shows how three major leaders, Zengi, Nur ad-Din, and 
Saladin (all claimed as Syrian), were able to form a unified internal front to meet the 
invaders.  The books second goal is to show how the nation, under these leaders, faced 
the “attacks of the Crusaders that were aimed at the land and people and at controlling 
Syria and exterminating the existence of Islam.”137  The theme of the importance of unity 
is still paramount, and modern parallels are still emphasized, but the negative effects of 
the Crusades for the Arabs are now more central.  The introduction states that “the Arab 
nation is still suffering until today from colonial and Zionist attacks which take the place 
of the Crusaders in weakening the Arabs and bringing about the continuation of the 
occupation of Palestine.”138  There is no talk here of lessons to be learned and a triumph 
over Israel similar to that over the Crusaders. There is instead a note of despondency over 
weakness in such statements as “many of the situations and happenings of the Crusades 
resemble those of the current situation of we, the victims, in numerous ways.”139   
Ma’adiyah, et al spend ten pages on the positive results of the Crusades for 
Europe, giving almost exclusive credit to the Crusades for the European Renaissance.  In 
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their view, Europe benefited socially, culturally, and economically from the Crusades.140  
To back up their claims, they quote extensively from Ernest Barker’s 1928 The Crusades, 
which shared their thesis.  This work has been entirely left behind by modern Western 
historiography, however, and it is interesting that it would still find acceptance, especially 
as their list of negative effects for the Islamic world is taken mostly from Runciman, 
whose work is less dated, and who finds negative effects for Europe from the Crusades as 
well.  Here we see a clear example of looking at ancient history through the lens of 
contemporary experience.  As for the Arab world, we see the now familiar Runciman 
thesis of the Crusades paving the way for Mongol conquest, but we also see some 
interesting religious results cited.  As these authors cite for the Crusades, recent reverses 
had led to more religiosity in the Arab world, as we shall examine in a later section.  
Reflective of the renewed interest in religion, the authors cite the Crusades as having led 
to a greater concern for Islam and for the status of Jerusalem among the people and as 
having re-awakened jihad in the path of God, particularly in Syria, but also throughout 
the Islamic world.141 
Hamidah: The Crusades 
Hamidah’s work is primarily a military study of the Crusades.  Published in 
Baghdad in 1990, it mirrors the bellicose rhetoric of Iraq of that era, stating categorically 
the intent of the West to weaken and oppress the Arabs in the Crusades, through 
colonialism, and through the creation and support of Israel.  In Hamidah’s estimation, 
these are merely different manifestations of the same goals.  He has published his history 
of the Crusades because, in his estimation, the true version has been intentionally 
obscured by Westerners. 
As for the Muslim books, after Islamic thought relied upon ideas that 
Europe provided it after the World War I, there was a shadow aimed at 
obscuring this period of Islamic history with the knowledge that the 
revival efforts which Arabs and Muslims had undertaken in that period 
and the sacrifices they put forth were more radiant than those of the 
Crusaders themselves.  Armed resistance to this invasion on the part of the  
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Muslims lasted for the entire two hundred years of the Crusades without 
relaxation until the conditions for expelling the Crusaders and liberating 
the land they occupied were realized.142 
 
If Hamidah is uncovering previously obscured truths, they seem remarkably like, 
though more forcefully stated than, the interpretations found in earlier Arabic histories.  
In his estimation, the Crusaders came due to papal political ambition, though the 
volunteer masses bought into the religious “mask.”  He offers the now standard popular 
Arab demand for the Counter-Crusade, though he stakes Iraq’s claim to leading the jihad. 
He also argues for the continuous and unified nature of the movement; even though some 
individual Muslim princes were weak and didn’t further the jihad, the masses realized 
that “the only way to defeat the Crusaders was to not accept the idea of their presence in 
the Muslim lands and to not live with them in peace.”143   
Hamidah is more hopeful of a new victory than other post-1967 authors, although, 
rather than expressing the victory in the Crusades in triumphant terms, it is seen more as 
a long and sorrowful struggle in which the Arab Islamic world suffered “hundreds of 
thousands of victims until they were able to expel the invaders and free the land from 
their occupation.”144  The implication is that any victory over Israel would be a similarly 
long and difficult road.  He has written his book specifically to show parallels between 
the Crusades and the Arab world post-World War I and how to “benefit from it in treating 
the current situation.”145  In Hamidah’s narrative, Arab weakness and disunity led to 
European colonization after World War I, and the colonial powers “did not shun 
imposing ignorance and poverty on the Arab countries” and didn’t leave until “after the 
Zionist entity was planted in the heart of the Arab nation,” an entity which “if it differs in 
shape from the Crusader invasion, agrees with it in its goals and purposes.”146  The goal 
of occupying Palestine, both in the Crusade era and with the modern imposition of the 
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“Zionist entity,” is presented as a strategic effort to “cut off contact between the parts of 
the Arab nation in favor of numerous artificial borders between its parts.”147 
Some of Hamidah’s assertions seem built on shaky logic.  For example, he states 
that “the Arabs seized Syria from the Byzantine Empire which was occupying that Arab 
land, and the Arab armies liberated Jerusalem in the year 15 hijri.”148  While he might be 
claiming Syria as “Arab land” because some of the inhabitants of portions of what is now 
Syria were Arab-speakers, the notion of Byzantium occupying Arab Syria in a time 
before Arabs had ever held Syria seems peculiar.  Other assertions are equally 
disingenuous.  In the time between the Arab conquest and the Crusades he claims 
The Muslims left all the religions in perfect peace....Peace was not 
disturbed except by what was committed by armies of the Byzantine 
Empire by way of acts of vengeance against Islamic areas, which led in 
the end to lighting the fire of the Crusades.149 
 
This perfect peace seems unlikely, especially as he admits in the following 
paragraph that Christian pilgrims suffered difficulties in Seljuk held areas.  Having said 
that, however, Hamidah spends two pages enumerating the perfectly valid reasons for 
these difficulties.  In part, Hamidah lays the blame on Byzantium, as Seljuk actions were 
in response to the above mentioned atrocities, and, as Byzantium supported Armenian 
Christians in Seljuk territory, a general distrust of Christians.  In part, he explains it as a 
natural tendency among the Seljuks, who were new to Islam and came from a tribal 
background and were, therefore, extremely pro-Islam and anti other religions.150  This 
marks the first appearance in a mainstream history of such an apologist approach which 
puts all blame for any negative actions on the “other party.” 
Jindi: Crusader Colonialism in Palestine 
Jindi’s Crusader Colonialism, published in 2006, and thus the most recent work 
considered here, shows the prolonged continuity of the themes that we have been 
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examining.  Its point of view is apparent from the title, which characterizes the Crusades 
as a colonial movement.  Jindi emphasizes this in his first chapter. 
This book, entitled Crusader Colonization in Palestine covers a subject 
both ancient and modern, ancient because it goes back to the age of 
Crusader expansion against the Arab world, when, in the last part of the 
eleventh century A.D., the European West unleashed the well known 
colonial campaigns against the countries of the Arab East and West to 
extend its influence and its control over them. It is also a modern subject 
because the current time urgently requires this type of research, due to the 
human tragedy which the Western colonialists practice in Palestine by 
means of the Zionist colonial entity there in the last half of the twentieth 
century and what this entity does in the occupied Arab lands in the West 
Bank of the Jordan river, the Gaza Strip, Rafah, the Syrian Golan Heights, 
and Southern Lebanon....This tragedy truthfully resembles, in nature and 
extent, the Crusader hostility.151 
In building parallelism between the colonial nature of the Crusader movement and 
modern experience, Jindi cites several examples of “colonial Crusaderism.”  While the 
modern version is implicit, all of these results are commonly avowed as relevant to Israel.  
Jindi cites the Crusades as having caused a refugee crisis, which upset the ethnic balance 
in the areas the refugees settled.  He also cites the Crusaders as encouraging European 
immigration to attempt to balance the numbers and the difficulty the King of Jerusalem 
had in controlling military forces, especially those newly arrived.152  In a glimmer of hope 
for the future reminiscent of Astal and Qasim’s analyses from the early 1980s, Jindi also 
discusses social changes in Europe in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, including 
diminished Papal influence, which led to a gradual decline in support for the Crusader 
states.153  
Jindi’s main secondary source, now over fifty years old, is Runciman, and like 
almost all examined works, Stevenson’s book, which, now one hundred years old, 
continues to serve as an important source for Arab histories.  Only a couple of post-1950s 
Western sources are cited and both of these are from the early 1970s. But one of these is 
Prawer’s controversial work The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in 
the Middle Ages, which shares Jindi’s thesis.  In general, the use of only sources that fit 
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one’s thesis, and of not presenting alternate interpretations, seems common to these 
works.  The Crusades have a certain meaning to these historians, and that is the narrative 
which they present.  
The narrative of the Crusades among mainstream post-World War II Arab 
historians is one of Western attack on a disunified Arab world.  While some cite 
atrocities, the main concern is not the physical acts of the invaders, but the imposition of 
a foreign state in the “heart of the Arab Nation.”  The parallel to Israel is not only clear, it 
is annunciated, as is, to a lesser extent, that of colonialism on the part of the European 
powers.  The “Counter-Crusade” is presented as a unified and continuous Arab effort, 
more or less triumphant depending on the viewpoint of the author and the modern lens 
through which he looks. Finally, the Crusades brought positive results to Europe, whereas 
they weakened the Arab world and explained later defeats.  This is not a narrative that 
came naturally from ancient Arab histories which still impact people to this day; it is the 
result of the re-interpretation of history throughout the last fifty years. 
B. THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST NARRATIVE OF THE CRUSADES 
Most modern Islamic fundamentalist positions were articulated in the post-
colonial era of the triumphant ascendancy of secular nationalism.  These were 
movements at the margins, as secularism was at first seen by most Arabs as having 
delivered on its promises.  As problems, such as lack of opportunities and social inequity, 
became more prevalent in the revolutionary republics, however, space opened for Islamic 
opposition.  Adherents became easier to find as the luster of secular nationalism faded 
and Islamic groups, many of them fundamentalist in ideology, grew in numbers and 
influence.  One of the largest such groups was the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
The Muslim Brotherhood under Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) and, later, the more 
radical Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) saw Islam as a “complete system” and had a goal of 
establishing an Islamic state that would implement top-down reform.  Qutb denounced 
the secular nationalist system as “jahiliyya” (ignorance, i.e., un-Islam) during Nasser’s 
repression of the late 1950s and 60s, and the Brotherhood has often operated as a semi-
covert organization within Egypt, often in violent opposition to the government.  With 
Islam as the “complete system,” and the rashidun era of the original followers of the 
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prophet as the only time worth of emulation (salaf), Islamic Fundamentalists have 
different narratives on many issues, including the Crusades.   Qutb, the Brotherhood’s 
chief ideologue, first articulated this narrative in the late 1940s through the early 1960s. 
While the Crusade narrative was not highly developed or highly resonant at the time, 
later social factors led to Islamic Fundamentalist views of the Crusades becoming an 
important facet of the discourse. 
1. Sayyid Qutb 
For Sayyid Qutb, the concept of the “Arab Nation” was valueless.  To him, the 
issue was one of the Dar al-Islam in its totality.  As such, Qutb spoke not about attacks 
on Arabs, but about attacks on the religion of Islam itself.  To him, the greatest threat 
facing Islam was not external attack, but internal ignorance.  He also, however, was 
influenced by his surroundings, and thus saw Jews and Israel as among Islam’s threats.  
The Crusades and colonialism seemed secondary concern to Qutb, but they were often 
conflated with the issue of Israel, much as occurred in the nationalist discourse.  In 
Qutb’s mind, however, attacks were not about territory or acquisitiveness or even control.  
They were about the distortion and destruction of Islam. 
Qutb wrote no works specifically on the Crusades, but he did include his view of 
the Crusades as a sidebar in several of his works.  It is difficult to determine the precise 
dating of many of Qutb’s works, as they were only formally printed well after they were 
written, and he included no dates.  Of the three noted references to the Crusades, 
however, all seem to be from the late 1940s and early 1950s and are found in two of his 
best known works, Social Justice in Islam154, and In the Shade of the Quran,155 while one 
was found in his little known and posthumously published Our Struggle with the Jews.156  
Qutb offers the Crusades, which he interprets as all Christian attacks on Islam, from 
Byzantine response to the original Muslim conquest of Syria to twentieth century colonial 
dispossession of Muslims in Zanzibar, as one of the two great struggles between Islam 
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and polytheism (“associators,” i.e., those who deny the complete uniqueness of God).157  
In his estimation, “the Crusades” are the polytheist response to the original Islamic 
conquest and represent a counter-attack aimed against the spirit of Islam.  With this wide 
description of the Crusades, and with the close association with Zionism, almost any 
hostility not internal to Islam can be denounced as a Crusade.   
Qutb, like nationalist historians, explicitly conflates Zionism and the Crusades.  In 
the era of the Crusades itself, it was the Jews who helped the Crusaders in his narrative, 
whereas in the modern era, the Western support of Israel is, among other evils, 
Crusaderism. 
Not once did they stop their multifarious scheming against Islam, and with 
a determination that never weakened.  No one has ever worked against 
Islam during any period of its history, including the Crusades and all 
forms of colonialism, without having had some help and encouragement 
from the Jews.158   
We may be overawed when we say that all Western countries are 
supporting the Israelis....True support comes from God, not from people 
and states, even though they may have hydrogen bombs and missiles to 
deliver them. ..Let us then, not be frightened by the support given by the 
atheists, polytheists, and Crusaders to the Jews.159 
 
This mutual support leads to a rhetorical turn of phrase that has since become 
quite familiar.  “The Jews are [also] the ones who utilize Christianity and idolatry in this 
comprehensive war....And they attack every foundation of this religion [Islam], in a 
Crusader-Zionist war!”160  Similarly, he conflates the Crusades and Imperialism: 
As we trace the development further, in the West we find the war in Spain, 
and in the East the disaster of the Crusades....From that time to this it 
[Islam] has had to contend with ferocious enemies of the same spirit as the 
Crusaders, enemies both open and hidden. 
But the final overthrow of Islam took place only in the present age, when 
Europe conquered the world, and when the dark shadows of colonization 
spread over the whole Islamic world, East and West alike.  Europe 
mustered all its forces to extinguish the spirit of Islam, it revived the 
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inheritance of the Crusaders’ hatred, and it employed all the materialistic 
and intellectual powers at its disposal.161 
There are those who hold that it is the financial influence of the Jews of 
the United States and elsewhere which has governed the policy of the 
West.  There are those who say that it is English ambition and Anglo-
Saxon guile which are responsible for the present position.  And there are 
those who believe that it is the antipathy between East and West which is 
responsible.  All these opinions overlook one vital element in the question 
to which all other elements are subordinate, the Crusader spirit which runs 
in the blood of all Occidentals.  It is this which colors their thinking, 
which is responsible for their imperialistic fear of the spirit of Islam, and 
for their efforts to crush Arab strength.162 
 
2. The Message Spreads 
Many of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were pushed out of Egypt by Nasser’s 
government from the mid-1950s on, and Qutb himself was executed by the Egyptian 
government in 1966.  His message may have remained obscure but for two new factors, 
the rise of Saudi Arabia and the declining fortunes of Arab nationalism.  Many of Qutb’s 
followers found refuge in Saudi Arabia and, with Islamic fundamentalist doctrine’s 
similarity in many ways to the kingdom’s Wahabism, found themselves accepted within 
the Islamic educational establishment.  Many former members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood taught at the Medina University.  “Sayyid Qutb’s writings, which were 
edited and published by his brother Muhammad Qutb in Saudi Arabia, were held in high 
esteem by his growing contingent of followers there.”163   
While this was a larger audience than previously, fundamentalist ideas may yet 
have remained obscure if not for nationalism’s great loss of legitimacy.   While 
corruption and other social injustice among secular governments had already created 
disillusionment among some, the greatest symbol of failure for the secular nationalists 
was the disaster of the Six day War in 1967.  With this catastrophic event “the consensus 
around nationalist values was beginning to crumble.”164  Islamic fundamentalism was 
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well positioned as an alternative.  This was followed shortly by the oil boom in Saudi 
Arabia that fueled “Petro-Islam,” as Saudi money flooded Islamic causes worldwide, 
most notably for the purposes of this study, in education.   
Under Saudi influence, the notion of a worldwide ‘Islamic domain of 
shared meaning’ transcending the nationalist divisions among Arabs, 
Turks, Africans and Asians was created.  All Muslims were offered a new 
identity that emphasized their religious commonality while down-playing 
differences of language, ethnicity, and nationality.165   
 
For history, this meant a new sense of the “Islamic Nation” and its shared 
experiences of, among other things, the Crusades, as influenced by the writings of Sayyid 
Qutb.   Thus, by 1983 the Saudi history textbook for the eleventh grade was titled History 
of the Islamic State. While it presents the Crusades in orthodox terms, as conflated with 
colonialism and Israel, it does so in an overtly religious manner, and includes the 
Ottoman Empire, normally ignored by Arab nationalist readings, among the victims.  
The Saudi eleventh grade text of 1983 treats this topic 
[colonialism] differently.  This text describes the actions of the European 
countries as ‘Crusader imperialism.’  Also, this text deals only with the 
Muslim world.  Finally, this text bases its entire discussion upon Islamic 
religious concepts.  ‘The main goal of Crusader imperialism behind 
imposing its authority on Muslims all over the world was to humiliate 
them and exploit their wealth, civilization, and heritage.’   
This text continues by describing the tactics employed by the 
imperialists to achieve their goals.  Specifically, it discusses ‘a conspiracy 
against the Ottoman Caliphate by inspiring the Nationalistic Movement in 
the area...European imperialism also supported the Zionist Jews against 
the Islamic rule of the Ottomans.’166  
 
The Islamic Fundamentalist narrative is similar enough in its content to the more 
familiar Arab narrative, if different in tone and widening the ring of who the victims are, 
to resonate as a reasonable departure with some of those who accept the nationalist 
interpretation as a starting point. 
                                                 
165 Giles Keppel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, 73. 
166  Aydh Athopaiti, A Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of  World and Arab History in Saudi 
Arabian and Egyptian High School History Textbooks since 1900 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 
1987), 240-241. 
56 
3. Expanding on the Theory 
Now that Islamic Fundamentalist readings were at least peripherally part of the 
main stream of Crusade analysis, several analyses written from this perspective appeared.  
The first of these was written by Dr. Ahmad Shalabi, a professor and Chair of the 
Department of Islamic History and Islamic Civilization at the Dar al-’Alum College, 
University of Cairo in 1986. 
Shalabi: The Crusades 
Dr. Shalabi, who’s credits include Jews in the Shadows: A Study of the Methods 
and Institutions which the Jews Invented against the Knowledgeable People: The 
Daggers of Masonry and Rotarianism among Easterners and Westerners,167 a work 
based heavily on the discredited Protocols of the Elders of Zion, would not seem from 
such reference to be an appropriate academic source.  His position at a legitimate 
university and his many other credits for works on Islamic thought and history mark him 
as an accepted academic and further mark the level to which Islamic Fundamentalist 
thought has achieved legitimacy in the Arab world.  In 1986 he published The Crusades: 
Their beginning with the Emergence of Islam and their Continuity until Today: 
Description of the Western Crusade Military and Ideological Attacks on the Islamic 
World across the Ages.168  This work, as the title indicates, accepts Qutb’s expanded 
definition of Crusade, and expands upon Qutb’s rhetorical framework to produce an 
entire tome. 
The Crusades are long-lasting. 
Many people err if they picture the Crusades as only that which the Pope 
‘Urban II’ announced in Claremont France on 26 November, 1095, and 
which ended approximately two centuries later in the era of the Egyptian 
Sultan ‘al-Ashraf Khalil’ in 1292 A.D. 
The root of this error, which many make by tying this term to the wars 
fought between the Kings of Europe on one side and Syria and Egypt on 
the other, as I see it, is that the Crusades—or the Crusading movement—
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began before Pope ‘Urban II’ by several centuries, and similarly, they 
lasted after al-Ashraf Khalil by several centuries, and they are still 
ongoing in one form or another.  Their works become clear occasionally 
when the entire West occupies the entire Islamic world and steals this 
world and places it in shadow and barbarity; and knowledge about them 
disappears from view occasionally when the West appears to undertake 
friendship between it and some of the Islamic countries, or all of them, to 
distract them from feverish Crusade efforts, i.e., creating a Zionist country 
in Palestine to be an eternal thorn for all Arabs and all Muslims. 
The Crusades are against all Muslims. 
There is another mistake related to that error which is far more dangerous, 
for many researchers and cultured people fall into the trap when they 
follow the West in saying that the Crusades were against the Arabs and 
that their goal was recovering Jerusalem, for the truth is that the goal was 
deeper than that and more dangerous.  The Crusader movement was 
against all Muslims and not against the Arabs alone, and their goal was to 
humiliate the Muslims and bring down damage upon them....This can also 
be seen in the numerous strikes launched by Christians to attempt to 
colonize the entire Islamic world, Arab and non-Arab, and by creating 
Israel in this place so that this country may play its role at the Crusader 
direction, and it can also be seen in the strikes on Iraq and Tunis and the 
threats against Pakistan, and, similarly, the destructive Russian advance on 
Afghanistan.169 
 
With this wide definition of the Crusades, Shalabi identifies twenty-two separate 
manifestations of the Crusades or the “Crusading movement,” each of which is treated in 
a short chapter explaining his conception of it.  Of these chapters, only one deals directly 
with the Crusades as defined in this study, or as Shalabi puts it, “the famous Crusades of 
1097-1292 A.D..”  Two others deal with issues commonly conflated with the Crusades, 
colonialism and the creation of Israel.  The others treat issues from those perhaps 
intuitively related, such as European/Ottoman competition and Napoleon’s Egypt 
campaign, to such far-flung issues as “the Crusading movement cooperates with the 
Zionists to create clubs which spit poison into the Islamic world, such as the Masons, 
Rotary, and Lions.”170  Shalabi’s work is not so much a history of the Crusades as it is a 
book-length expansion of Qutb’s conception of the Crusades as the framework of an epic 
struggle between the West and the Islamic world. 
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Habibah, The Muslims and the Crusaders, and Struggle in the East  
Habibah, on the other hand, while coming from a similar philosophical 
background, concentrates on the history involved and treats the Crusades in a way much 
more closely related to the nationalist-inspired histories examined above.  His books are 
histories of the Crusades, rather than statements of position, yet the Islamic 
fundamentalist position can be found throughout them.   Habibah’s works, 1990’s The 
Muslims and the Crusaders,171 and 1994’s Struggle in the East172 are remarkably similar.  
The second seems to be, for the most part, a redaction of the first for a more general 
readership and includes the introduction and other large portions which are in extensio 
quotations of the first.  As such, they will be treated together in this work.  
In the fundamentalist conception of the Crusades, it is not Arab disunity that 
offered opportunity to the Crusaders, but the Muslims’ lack of adherence to true Islam. In 
Habibah’s conception “weakness in Islam was due to inconstancy and innovation in 
Islamic education,” as contrasted with the rashidun era, which was the time of Islam’s 
power. 173  Thus, while the Muslims were engaged in a defensive struggle, their religious 
weakness left them vulnerable. 
We don’t understand that the Crusades were solely a religious war whose 
effects were fanaticism and narrow-mindedness well known in that era.  
This conclusion comes after we look at the Muslim side in terms of its 
defensive use of force in order to destroy the dangers at hand or after 
examining the conditions of the Muslims, which came from the 
provocation of the invasion of their lands....That differs, however, from 
the case of the Christians, who found an opportunity in the hearts of the 
Muslims because of their distance from Islam, or because of the removal 
of Islam from its family.174 
 
Habibah presents the results of the invasion as a Crusader victory, and, while he 
later references the expulsion of the Crusaders as a victory also, it is the initial Muslim 
defeat that is highlighted.  As is the case in the nationalist narrative, the Crusades are 
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presented as highly relevant today, though the lesson to be learned is religious, rather 
than “Arab unity.”  “Muslim defeats came against the European at first and in many later 
battles, from the Europeans in Andalusia, etc., and from the colonialists in the modern 
era....All of these defeats came after inconstancy and its entrenchment.”175  If inconstancy 
in Islam is the problem, then righteousness in Islamic education is the solution and, 
Habibah offers, the current era, like the Crusading era, does not give enough importance 
to Islamic education.176   
Habibah agrees whole-heartedly with the assertion of European benefits and Arab 
impairment as the results of the Crusades.   
It is well known that these wars had contradictory results for the two sides 
that fought in them.  Among these contradictions is that they led to a 
worsening of weakness and dissolution in all the Arab countries.  This 
decay continued for a long time, such that it formed one of the reasons 
related to the Turkish occupation of the Arab lands.  This occupation led, 
in turn, to the control over all of our people by Western colonialists, which 
the Arab nations suffered through in recent times. 
As for the Europeans, in spite of the fact that they returned defeated to 
their countries in the end, they nonetheless were on the threshold of a 
conclusive civilizational Renaissance, which developed throughout the era 
and increased its blessings and had multiple results leaving many 
marks....It is certain that the first origins of this Renaissance happened as a 
result of contact between the Europeans and the Arab Islamic civilization, 
by way of the Crusades, etc..177 
 
Habibah presents a view of the Crusades markedly similar to the nationalist 
imagining examined above.  With such similarity, this more measured fundamentalist 
interpretation can resonate well with those Arabs brought up on the view of Crusades 
developed since World War II and presented by secular nationalist governments and 
education systems.  Among those disenchanted with such governments, even maximal 
presentations such as Qutb and Shalabi’s may find favor. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Current Arab conceptions of the Crusades are not simply a memory that continues 
from that era until today.  They are the result of a complex pattern of interpretation, 
carried out, for the most part, over the course of the last century.  Much as Muslims took 
time during the Crusades to develop any sense of urgency or outrage over the Frankish 
presence, so too did Arabs develop a view of the Crusades as a unified historical event 
with gradually increasing connotations in the modern era.  Only with the coming of the 
European powers and their strong and romantic attachment to the Crusades did the 
concept gain any attention.   
The early connections between Europe, especially France, and local Christians 
overtly seeking their patronage led to the insertion of the Crusades into the Arabic 
discourse.  Only repeated European references and activities drawing parallels to the 
Crusades would bring them relevance.  The putative words of Allenby and Gourad may 
have brought little reaction at the time, but modern realities made them loom large in 
later years.  In 1988, HAMAS included both incidents in Article 15 of their charter. 
The partition of Palestine brought particular resonance to the study of the 
Crusades, and the vast majority of Arab histories of the Crusades follow the 
announcement of the partition.  The issue of Israel looms largest in the re-imaging of the 
Crusades.  Almost all examined sources have drawn that parallel.  Pre-1967 Arab 
histories of the Crusades draw a narrative of a European invasion of a divided land, 
followed by an heroic Arab unification and eventual triumph.  After the disaster of the 
Six Day War, the narrative remained similar, but the depth of loss became highlighted, as 
did the assumption of unequal results from the Crusades that led Europe to world 
domination, while the Arab world, weakened by the Crusades, fell to the Mongols, the 
Ottomans, and the Europeans in succession. 
Islamic fundamentalists developed a parallel interpretation of the Crusades.  
While similar in many ways, the Crusades in their presentation, were aimed not at “the 
heart of the Arab nation,” but at Islam as a whole.  It is this vision that Usama bin Laden 
invokes in his Crusade references, such as his famed 1998 fatwa in which he said: 
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Despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the Crusader-
Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has 
exceeded one million....Despite all this, the Americans are once again 
trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with 
the protracted blockade imposed after a ferocious war, or the 
fragmentation and devastation. 
So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate 
their Muslim neighbors.178  
 
While bin Laden’s maximalist interpretation of the Crusades may resonate 
strongly only among fundamentalists, other interpretations, borrowing from both 
traditions and aimed at more common parallels, seem to resonate well even with what the 
West refers to as “moderate Arabs.”  In the view of many Arabs, HAMAS is fighting a 
war of liberation, and mixed nationalist and religious Crusade references such as these 
from the HAMAS charter, if not how they would put it, are nonetheless perfectly 
legitimate. 
Hamas regards Nationalism (Wataniyya) as part and parcel of the religious 
faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in Nationalism than waging Jihad against 
the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the 
Muslims.  
....There is no escape from introducing fundamental changes in 
educational curricula in order to cleanse them from all vestiges of the 
ideological invasion which has been brought about by orientalists and 
missionaries. 
That invasion had begun overtaking this area following the defeat of the 
Crusader armies by Salah a-Din el Ayyubi. The Crusaders had understood 
that they had no way to vanquish the Muslims unless they prepared the 
grounds for that with an ideological invasion which would confuse the 
thinking of Muslims, revile their heritage, discredit their ideals, to be 
followed by a military invasion. That was to be in preparation for the 
Imperialist invasion, as in fact [General] Allenby acknowledged it upon 
his entry to Jerusalem: “Now, the Crusades are over.” General Gouraud 
stood on the tomb of Salah a-Din and declared: “We have returned, O 
Salah-a-Din!” Imperialism has been instrumental in boosting the 
ideological invasion and deepening its roots, and it is still pursuing this 
goal. All this had paved the way to the loss of Palestine. We must imprint 
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on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a 
religious one, to be dealt with on this premise.179  
 
Modern Arab conceptions of the Crusades are not entirely about loss, but the 
current balance of relative power does lend an air of discouragement.  The current 
experience is imagined as the end result of the experience of the Crusades.  Despite the 
eventual expulsion of the Crusaders, it is this notion of “unequal results that explain 
current realities” that makes the Crusades a defeat.  From the fundamentalist viewpoint, 
the great discouragement of the modern era is that the Muslims are still removed from the 
Islam of the rashidun.  To the nationalists, it is that the Arab world has been unable to 
achieve a common front against the invader.  Either way, the current situation resembles 
that of the era of Crusader victories after the invasion, not that of the heady days of the 
Crusader expulsion.  Thus the Crusades are imagined as today as a disheartening defeat.  
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